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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
MODELING A PHOSPHORUS CREDIT TRADING PROGRAM IN THE LAKE
OKEECHOBEE WATERSHED
by
Juliana Corrales
Florida International University, 2015
Miami, Florida
Professor Fernando Miralles-Wilhelm, Major Professor
Lake Okeechobee is the largest lake in the southeastern United States and is a central
component of the hydrology and environment of the Everglades ecosystem in South
Florida. The natural state of the lake has been degraded as wetlands and natural
habitats in the Lake Okeechobee watershed have been replaced with farms, urban
areas, and dairy operations. Excessive phosphorus loadings from these diverse sources
have been identified as the leading causes of the lake’s impairment. For more than
four decades, many resources have been allocated to regional and local restoration
efforts to reduce phosphorus loadings into the lake. However, phosphorus loadings
have not decreased and the recovery of the lake could take more time, particularly
with today’s limited local budgets.
Market-based instruments, such as water quality trading programs, have emerged over
the past decades to cost-effectively achieve water quality objectives in impaired
watersheds. The main objective of this dissertation was to assess the environmental
and economic benefits of implementing a phosphorus trading program in Lake
Okeechobee watershed, compared to a conventional command-and-control approach.
A comprehensive literature overview of nationally and internationally implemented
trading programs was conducted to highlight advantages and challenges of these
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programs towards achieving water quality goals, and to outline the essential elements
of a successful program. Furthermore, a modeling framework, integrating a
hydrologic-water quality model with an economic model, was developed to assess the
potential cost savings that trading might offer over a command-and-control approach.
The modeling framework was applied in three priority basins of the Lake Okeechobee
watershed. In each case, while developing trading scenarios to achieve phosphorus
load reduction targets, the trading program was less expensive than the conventional
command-and-control approach.
This research provided the foundation for stakeholders to better understand whether
water quality trading has the potential to work in the Lake Okeechobee watershed and
to facilitate the development of a pilot program. In addition, it offered some insights
on the potential economic opportunities that pollution sources would have by
participating in the trading program. The modeling framework developed in this
dissertation could facilitate the assessment of future water quality trading programs in
other watersheds.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Nutrient pollution, caused by excess nitrogen and phosphorus inputs to the
environment, is one of the world’s most challenging, widespread, and costly
environmental problems. For decades, the increase of nutrient enrichment has
threatened the ecological integrity and economic sustainability of many rivers, lakes,
and coastal waters. The proliferation of nutrients have been seen in Lake Ladoga and
the Baltic Sea in Europe (Drabkova et al., 1996; Paerl and Huisman, 2008), Lake
Victoria in Africa, Lake Taihu in Asia (Paerl et al., 2011), and the Amazon River and
Lake Okeechobee in the Americas (Demaster and Pope, 1996; Havens and Gawlik,
2005). In the United States alone, nutrient pollution ranks in the top three leading
causes of impairment of rivers and lakes, affecting the public water supply, aquatic
wildlife, and agricultural, recreational, and industrial activities (USEPA, 2009).
Freshwater nutrient pollution is estimated to cost the United States at least $ 2.2
billion annually (Dodds et al., 2009). Since the establishment of the Clean Water Act
(CWA), considerable efforts have been adopted towards reducing nutrient pollution
from point sources. However, with rapid urban and agricultural development, it seems
that water body impairments that result from excessive nutrient inputs are a neverending environmental problem. Part of this environmental problem is the complex
nature of nutrient pollution and the challenging task of controlling nonpoint emissions
(Ouyang et al., 2009; Zhang and Huang, 2011). Undoubtedly, another part of the
problem is today’s national and local economic constraints (Faeth, 2000).
When devising environmental policy instruments for solving environmental
problems, policymakers have the difficult task of evaluating different policies
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strategies using several factors, such as efficiency, cost-effectiveness, fairness
(distributional equity of benefits or costs), ability to address uncertainties, and
political feasibility (Goulder and Parry, 2008). In the water quality arena, the
environmental policies currently implemented have been heavily dominated by
traditional command-and-control (CAC) or regulatory approaches (Harrington and
Morgenstern, 2004). However, there has been a notable increase in popularity of
incentive-based (IB) mechanisms to address water body impairments. One widely
discussed IB approach is the cap-and-trade system (also known as a tradeable permit
program) (Goodstein, 2011). The economic advantage that the IB approach offers
over CAC approaches is the main reason for increased interest in this alternative tool
(Stavins and Whitehead, 1996). Certainly, the successful experience of reducing
sulfur dioxide and other air emissions using IB instruments has helped to boost the
expectations for the implementation of cap-and-trade tools in the water quality field
(Field and Field, 2006).
Water quality trading is cost effective since pollution sources with low abatement
costs can reduce their emissions beyond imposed limits and generate credits that can
be sold to other sources with high treatment costs. Allowing the trade of credits
reduces the overall costs of pollution control, while attaining water quality goals
(Faeth, 2000). In addition, trading offers pollution sources the flexibility to control
their emissions while exploring and implementing innovative technologies and
practices for pollution control (Goodstein, 2011). Water quality trading programs
(WQTPs) have been implemented in different countries, such as Australia, Canada,
the United States, and New Zealand (Selman et al., 2009; Shortle, 2013). In a survey
conducted by Selman et al. (2009), 57 WQTPs were identified worldwide, 51 of
which are located in the United States. The implemented WQTPs have been evaluated
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in several reports and articles (Borghesi, 2014; Mariola, 2009; Newburn and
Woodward, 2012; USEPA, 2009), and while some studies reported successful
outcomes, most of the papers underlined the limited trading activities that have
actually taken place. Although trading is generally driven by regulations, it is
incentivized by economics, which means that if there is not enough financial
attractiveness, pollution sources might not be eager to participate in a trading program
(USEPA, 2003). Therefore, it is critical that promoters of WQT understand and
overcome the potential challenges and limitations associated with this type of
program. It is widely accepted that WQTPs are not a panacea for water pollution
control, and their success or failure to provide cost-effective water quality
improvements will depend on how the program is designed and implemented (Newell
and Stavins, 2003; Shortle, 2013). Therefore, before investing resources to implement
a WQTP, it is important to conduct a feasibility analysis to determine the
environmental and economic benefits of a trading program for improving water
quality in a specific watershed. The feasibility analysis would also give insight to
prospective trading entities about the economic opportunities they would have by
participating in a trading program.
1.1. Motivation
Recognizing the economic prospects of IB tools over CAC approaches, the
motivation of this dissertation is to investigate the feasibility of implementing a
WQTP in an impaired freshwater body in the United States. With a surface area of
1,890 km2, Lake Okeechobee (LO) is the second largest freshwater lake in the
contiguous United States. Located in South Florida, it constitutes a critical link
between the Kissimmee River in the north, wetlands and bays in the south, and
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estuaries in the east and west. The natural state of the lake has been degraded as
wetlands and natural habitats in the Lake Okeechobee watershed (LOW) have been
replaced with farms, urban areas, and dairy operations (Hiscock et al., 2003).
Excessive phosphorus loadings from agriculture and livestock, municipal and
industrial wastewater discharges, and urban stormwater runoff have been identified as
the leading causes of the lake’s impairment (FDEP, 2001). According to the 2015
South Florida Environmental Report, the annual average (2010 – 2014) total
phosphorus (TP) loading discharged to LO is 442 metric tons (mtons) (Sharfstein et
al., 2015). The TP entering the LO is about 302 mtons greater than the Total
Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) of 140 mtons of TP per year mandated by the Florida
Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP). For more than four decades, many
resources have been allocated to regional and local restoration efforts to reduce
nutrient loadings to the lake (Havens and Gawlik, 2005). However, TP loadings to the
lake have not significantly decreased and the recovery of the lake could take more
time, particularly with today’s limited local budgets. Therefore, it is important to
investigate innovative economic incentives to address the phosphorus pollution
problem in LOW.
1.2. Objectives
The main objective of the present dissertation was to assess the environmental and
economic benefits of implementing a phosphorus trading program in the Lake
Okeechobee watershed compared to a conventional regulatory command-and-control
approach. In order to achieve this principal objective, the following specific
objectives were identified:
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•

Conduct a literature overview of worldwide water quality trading programs to 1)
assess advantages of these programs towards achieving water quality goals, 2)
identify challenges confronted during the design through the implementation
phase, and 3) outline the essential elements of a successful program.

•

Identify point and nonpoint phosphorus sources and estimate their associated TP
loadings in two sub-watersheds within the Lake Okeechobee watershed,
representing priority basins for phosphorus load controls and with different land
use and hydrologic characteristics.

•

Estimate attenuation ratios to account for biophysical processes within the stream
network of the sub-watersheds and derive delivery trading ratios to support the
phosphorus loading equivalence between trading sources at a different distance
from the outlet of the sub-watershed.

•

Develop an optimization model to identify the optimal combination of best
management practices and technologies to be implemented in the sub-watersheds
in order to minimize the cost of achieving a phosphorus reduction target.

•

Develop trading scenarios in the sub-watersheds to evaluate the potential trading
cost savings for achieving different phosphorus reduction targets and to determine
whether the conditions exist to support the implementation of a water quality
trading program involving point and nonpoint pollution sources.

1.3. Dissertation Structure
The remainder of this dissertation is organized in three main chapters. Each
chapter takes the form of a research paper intended to be a stand-alone chapter, that
has been either published or prepared for publication, and addresses one or several of
the specific objectives identified above.
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Chapter 2, published in the Irrigation and Drainage Journal, provides a review of
water quality trading programs around the world. This chapter identifies advantages,
challenges, and essential elements for the design and implementation of a trading
program. In addition, a meta-analysis is presented to prioritize the main factors
driving the success of a trading program.
Chapter 3, published in the Journal of Environmental Management, describes a
modeling framework integrating a hydrologic-water quality model with an economic
model to assess the cost-benefits of a phosphorus water quality trading program. It
also presents the first attempt to apply the developed modeling framework in an
agricultural sub-basin within the Lake Okeechobee watershed.
Chapter 4, using the framework developed in Chapter 3, evaluates and compares
the potential of a water quality trading program versus a command-and-control
approach to cost-effectively achieve different phosphorus load reduction targets. This
evaluation focuses on two sub-watersheds with different land use and hydrologic
conditions within the Lake Okeechobee watershed. In addition, Chapter 4 presents an
assessment of the effect of different caps on the trading program potential, while
considering several factors, such as the least-cost solutions, credit prices, potential
cost savings, and credit supply and demand.
Finally, a summary of this dissertation is presented in Chapter 5. Major
conclusions and recommendations for future work are also provided.
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CHAPTER 2
WATER QUALITY TRADING PROGRAMS TOWARDS SOLVING
ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION PROBLEMS
Corrales J, Naja GM, Rivero RG, Miralles-Wilhelm F, Bhat MG. 2013. Water quality
trading programs towards solving environmental pollution problems. Irrigation and
Drainage 62 (Suppl. 2): 72-92.
2.1. Abstract
Increased regulatory attention in controlling pollutants has encouraged the
development of water quality trading programs for the past several decades. These
trading programs could provide the mechanisms to cost-effectively achieve water
quality objectives. Encouragement of innovative methodologies for emission
prevention and control, and the contributions from non-regulated pollution sources are
also important factors in the development of successful water quality trading
programs. The objectives of this paper are to: assess the advantages of a trading
program to reach water quality goals while providing additional benefits to the whole
watershed; describe the challenges confronted during the design to implementation
phases; and outline the essential elements of a successful program. A meta-analysis
was also conducted using several water quality trading programs to assess main
market-based elements driving the success of trading programs between point and
agricultural nonpoint sources. Uncertainty, policy drivers and social embeddedness the degree to which stakeholders are integrated into the program development - seem
to be the most influential determinant of the program success.
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2.2. Introduction
Interest in environmental trading programs has been increasing for several
decades. The Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme (Australia), South Nation
Phosphorus Trading Program (Canada) and Lake Taupo Nitrogen Trading Program
(New Zealand) are some examples of trading programs already implemented or under
development around the world (Selman et al., 2009). In the United States (USA),
trading programs have been developed promoting economic and environmental
advantages (e.g., Breetz et al., 2004). The history of these environmental programs
can be traced back to the 1980s where inter-refinery trading was used to address lead
in gasoline (Kerr and Newell, 2003). Other environmental issues have been managed
through trading programs, such as acid rain, wetland mitigation, endangered species
habitat, stream bank restoration, greenhouse gas reduction, and most recent in the
water quality arena (Boyner, 2004; Burtraw and Palmer, 2004; Shabman and
Stephenson, 2004).
In theory, trading programs allow one polluting source to meet its regulatory
obligations by purchasing pollution reductions achieved by another source with lower
abatement costs. The latter, in turn, obtains revenue for their efforts in reducing
pollution (US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), 2007c). Generally
speaking, the sources with lower abatement costs are the nonpoint sources
unregulated under the Clean Water Act (CWA). In practice, because trading programs
are site specific, such as in the water quality case, trading policies and rules must be
applicable to suit the specific conditions of the watershed (Lal et al., 2009). For this
reason, trading programs design, objectives and success vary widely. Promoters of
trading have been using different names to define this type of program such as cap
and trade, effluent trading, and pollutant exchange just to name a few. Regardless of
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its name, the objective of any environmental trading program is to provide a costeffective mechanism and decision making flexibility to achieve an environmental goal
(Horan et al., 2002a; Shabman and Stephenson, 2007; Hamstead and BenDor, 2010;
Stephenson et al., 2010). In addition, water quality trading programs offer a policy
mechanism to engage nonpoint sources, i.e., pollution sources not regulated under the
federal regulatory extent of the CWA.
In water quality programs, US regulatory agencies have been leading the efforts
implementing trading systems to control effluents and achieve water quality standards
(Stephenson et al., 1998). Most of these efforts have been devoted to developing
trading policies and guidelines for different pollutants, such as nitrogen, phosphorus,
sediments, temperature and biological oxygen demand (USEPA, 2004; Lal et al.,
2009) focusing on the contaminant of concern in the watershed, impacting a specific
waterbody. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) has encouraged the
trading program concept while financing several feasibility studies and demonstration
efforts and issuing a water quality trading policy guide, a handbook and a toolkit for
permit writers (USEPA, 2003, 2004, 2007a). The United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) has also promoted water quality trading while releasing a new
policy for environmental management with the aim of expanding the use of market
mechanisms (USDA, 2006) and also targeting several aspects of point and nonpoint
trading mechanisms (Letson, 1992; Malik et al., 1993; Crutchfield et al., 1994).
Trading programs in the US have emerged in different watersheds to solve water
quality problems associated especially with excessive nutrient levels (Virginia
Department of Environmental Quality (VDEQ), 2008; Connecticut Department of
Environmental Protection (CTDEP), 2010a; Hamstead and BenDor, 2010). However,
even with several success stories, some authors remain skeptical and consider that the
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majority of these trading programs lack market-based fundamentals (Stephenson et
al., 1998; Collentine, 2006; Shabman and Stephenson, 2007), which would provide
more equitable, efficient, and cost-effective ways to address water quality problems
(Chesapeake Bay Program Nutrient Trading Negotiation Team (CPNT), 2001). On
the other hand, other trading program experts have demonstrated that it is possible to
design a program endorsing the potential benefits of a market-based system within the
existing regulatory structure (Boyd et al., 2003; Swift, 2005).
The objectives of this paper are to: review the potentials of a trading program
implemented to reach water quality goals; describe the challenges confronted during
the design to implementation phases; define the essential elements of a successful
program; and illustrate some examples of water quality trading programs to provide
insight into the development of a trading program in a specific watershed. Finally, a
meta-analysis was also conducted to rank the main elements driving the success of a
trading program.
2.3. Advantages of a Water Quality Trading Approach
The benefits of a trading program have been well acknowledged by economists,
policy makers and environmental groups in many reports and research papers (Boyd
et al., 2003; USEPA, 2003; Swift, 2005). The main advantage of trading programs in
comparison with the traditional command-and-control approaches is that trading
allows flexibility on whom and where pollution control measures are implemented
without prescribing how to achieve the reduction, thus creating incentives to innovate
within the pollution reduction scope (Borisova and Roka, 2009). Other advantages
cover a range of environmental, economic and social improvements in the specific
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watershed where the trading program is implemented. Table 2-1 summarizes the most
significant potential benefits of a water quality trading program.
Environmental benefits
From the environmental perspective, water quality trading programs advantages
are mainly focused on attainment of water quality standards, improved compliance
levels, and pollution prevention (Shabman and Stephenson, 2007). The attainment of
water quality targets is done through setting a mandatory watershed goal, commonly
known as a cap. This cap is the total pollutant amount allowed to be discharged from
a specific watershed. Under the CWA structure, the cap is often referred to as the
Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL), which is the maximum amount of pollutant that
a water body can receive and still meet its designated use (Borisova and Roka, 2009).
The cap is then distributed among sources by allocating permissions (or allowances)
to discharge a certain amount of pollutant in a limited time. In a market-based trading
program, the sources facing high pollution control costs (i.e. point sources) will meet
their allowances by purchasing environmentally equivalent pollution reductions from
other sources at a lower cost. Thus, trading has the potential to accomplish the same
or better overall water quality improvement in a watershed (USEPA, 2007a), and
reduce the cost of achieving pollution reductions mandated under the Clean Water
Act. Generally, nonpoint sources are achieving pollution loading reductions through
the implementation of Best Management Practices (BMP) monitored for efficiency,
process to be evaluated and approved by the regulatory authorities. Broader and
indirect potential environmental benefits could also be offered when implementing
water quality trading programs and reaching water quality standards (Swift, 2005).
Some of these additional benefits include improved wildlife habitat, endangered
species protection, erosion reduction, co-control of pollutants, flood retention, and
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potential restoration of wetlands (Hall and Biorn-Hansen, 2005). For instance, the
Rahr Malting project (Minnesota, USA) have reduced sedimentation and improved
soil conservation (USEPA, 2008). However, in general, the overriding focus on the
accomplishment of water quality standards overshadows the value and attainment of
ancillary environmental benefits.
Economic benefits
Economically, a water quality trading program's major benefit is to reduce the
individual pollution abatement cost and to decrease the aggregate cost of achieving
water quality goals in the watershed (Florida Department of Environmental Protection
(FDEP), 2010a). Generally, agricultural nonpoint sources incur lower abatement costs
than point sources (Newburn and Woodward, 2012), and therefore, any trading
between these sources leads to an overall cost reduction. For instance, for the Great
Miami River Pilot program (Ohio, USA), USEPA (2008) estimated the unit cost for
treatment plant upgrades around US$ 23 per pound of phosphorus removed, whereas
the unit cost for BMPs on farms were about US$ 1.08 per pound removed. The
opportunity to trade allowances and to adopt the best pollution control technology
based on specific conditions, are the means of creating financial incentives for this
pollution prevention program (Stephenson and Shabman, 2010). These incentives
apply to the sources seeking pollution reductions and those who are offering them:
low-abatement cost sources are stimulated by the revenues from selling the credits
accrued when reaching load reductions above their allocations, while high pollution
reduction cost sources benefit from implementing low-cost alternatives. As a result,
trading programs can provide an innovation mechanism to adopt – and even fund new methodologies for emissions prevention and control. This additional benefit

14

creates a market demand for innovative technologies to reduce the pollution levels to
even below the requirements (USEPA, 2004).
Social benefits
Trading programs also allow integrating economic and environmental advantages
with social benefits to a greater extent than traditional programs. It encourages
communication among point and nonpoint sources, regulatory agencies, the public
and other stakeholders to promote concerted solutions for a watershed with multiples
sources of pollution (USEPA, 1996; FDEP, 2010a). Exhaustive communication
among all trading participants including those who oversee the program could reduce
initial perceptions of risk and lack of equity, therefore enhancing the initial
willingness to discuss trading. Effective partnerships transcend conventional barriers
to sustain watershed management by establishing common goals, encouraging natural
resources stewardship, with economic mechanisms to achieve environmental
improvement. Furthermore, trading can offer the possibility for new and expanding
sources to purchase credits from existing sources, thus accounting for population
growth and water quality requirements (CPNT, 2001). One of the main benefits of
water quality trading programs is to achieve and maintain water quality goals with
population and economic growth.
2.4. Challenges Associated With Water Quality Trading Programs
Several limitations could hamper the practical and successful implementation of
the water quality trading concept, and also increase the risk that trading will not be
able to accomplish environmental quality goals. These challenges, summarized in
Table 2-2, can be grouped in three main categories: 1) regulatory, 2) uncertainty, and
3) economic barriers. The fourth program design category involving the credit supply
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and demand, the cost / price dynamics to support a market as well the geographic
restrictions was not discussed here but was mentioned in the Table for completeness.
Regulatory
The existing statutory and regulation constraints can limit the flexibility in the
credit exchange, a fundamental market-based principle of a trading program. Through
the issuance of individual National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permits, the current regulatory structure of the CWA grants legal permission to
discharge polluted water only to point sources (USEPA, 2007b). These point sources,
such as industrial and municipal wastewater treatment plants, discharge effluents into
water bodies at an identifiable location (Ribaudo and Gottlieb, 2011). However, in the
case of a nutrient trading program, nonpoint sources discharging over a diffuse area,
such as agricultural operations, do not have legal liabilities to control nutrient
discharges (Shabman and Stephenson, 2007). Yet, nonpoint sources are well known to
dominate the total nutrient loadings in the majority of watersheds (USEPA, 2000) and
also to offer, under most circumstances, lower nutrient reduction costs (Ribaudo et al.,
2005). Although nutrient abatement costs are site specific and technology dependent,
if a trading program fails to incorporate point and nonpoint sources of pollution, the
cost savings and compliance itself could be compromised. In addition, the credit
exchange flexibility could be threatened by covering just one category of pollution
sources.
There are practical ways of efficiently incorporating market-based characteristics
into a trading program design within the existing regulatory structure. One approach
already implemented is to perform trading under a group compliance permit (USEPA,
2007b) whereby association members can choose and implement their own initiatives
for pollution control with more credit exchange flexibility. In addition, under the
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group compliance scheme, the role of regulatory agencies is shifted from imposing
technologies to achieve effluent reduction to requiring monitoring and measurement
of discharged pollutants. This approach has been effectively implemented in the
Neuse River program (North Carolina, USA) where nitrogen loadings to estuaries
have diminished by 70 % since 1995, and savings have been observed when the group
permit association handled water quality monitoring (Neuse River Compliance
Association (NRCA), 2011). The group permit option for the Neuse River program
consisted of setting a collective cap for total nitrogen based on the sum of association
members' individual nitrogen allocations. In this program, point and nonpoint trading
occur indirectly through the North Carolina Wetland Restoration Fund. There are no
individual penalties as long as the group as a whole is in compliance. Only when the
group of regulated sources exceeds the cap, the group is then subject to a penalty that
must be paid to the Fund, that secures that the payments collected result in nonpoint
source nitrogen reductions (Breetz et al., 2004; Hamstead and BenDor, 2010).
Although, the Neuse River program diverges from the standard permit with which
regulatory agencies are familiar, it demonstrates that there is a way to facilitate a
workable permitting approach for water quality trading programs (USEPA, 2008).
A lack of consistent support in resources allocated to trading programs from
environmental agencies at the federal and state levels is another institutional obstacle.
While the federal government is encouraging trading program implementation, the
position of regional environmental agencies, particularly among permit writer with
preconceived notions of trading, is sceptical to explore new alternatives that stray
from the conventional approach. It is only when compliance targets are not reached
through the conventional rule making approach, that a trading program is explored as
an alternative. While evaluating water quality trading programs, USEPA (2008)
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reported that the lack of consistent support allocated to trading programs is a primary
barrier hindering their growth. Overcoming this culture is a constant battle that may
slow down the funding and implementation of water quality trading programs
(USEPA, 2008). One of the reasons for this scepticism could be that the federal and
regional agencies may not have invested enough time and resources into educating
and persuading the polluting entities on the long-term economic benefits of trading.
Uncertainty and hotspots
Some sceptics of water quality trading assume that trading can lead to the creation
of localized areas with high pollution levels (named 'pollution hotspots') within a
watershed (Swift, 2005). These hotspots result when water quality equivalence has
not been carefully taken into account in the program design. Water quality
equivalence can be addressed by determining appropriate equivalency factors or
trading ratios (USEPA, 2008). In order to develop these trading ratios, several factors,
such as the geographic and hydrologic complexity of the watershed, the properties of
the pollutant (e.g., different phosphorus forms can lead to different eutrophication
potentials), and scientific data (whenever available) need to be considered (Kerr and
Newell, 2003). Generally, a trading ratio means that more or less than one unit of
nonpoint source discharge reduction is required to offset one unit of point source
discharge (Borisova and Roka, 2009; Ribaudo and Gottlieb, 2011). Trading ratios are
also generally used to account for the pollutant assimilation in the watershed (delivery
ratio), for a polluting source impact on sensitive areas (water quality ratio), and to
accommodate the uncertainty of the loading reduction efficiency (uncertainty ratio)
particularly when nonpoint sources are participating in the program (Whitehead,
2006). Moreover, some programs include an additional retirement ratio to provide a
margin of safety for the overall trading program (CPNT, 2001). However, while these
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ratios might be desirable, high trading ratios could become a disincentive for nonpoint
source involvement by reducing the economic attractiveness of these trading
programs.
Moreover, additional uncertainties emerge when nonpoint sources are involved in
a trading program. Some authors argue that the physical characteristics of nonpoint
sources and their reliance on random weather events hinder the pollution loading
measurement at a reasonable cost (Malik et al., 1993; Shortle and Abler, 1997; Horan
et al., 2002b). The quantification challenge of nonpoint sources loadings can be
resolved using direct (quantification of flow and pollutant concentration) or indirect
measurement tools. Indirect estimation of the effluent reduction effectiveness of
different management practices is based on simulation models or results from other
studies (Lal et al., 2009). The Pennsylvania's Chesapeake Bay Water Quality Trading
program (Pennsylvania, USA) is one of the best examples dealing with the nonpoint
source loading uncertainty. A scientifically sound analysis assessing BMPs efficiency
values, adjusted to account for uncertainties, was implemented and incorporated into
the Bay watershed model (as long-term averages) (Simpson and Weammert, 2008).
This reduced the need for uncertainties ratios when trading involved nonpoint sources,
while maintaining the delivery, reserve and edge of segment ratios, (Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP), 2009).
Economic barriers
The costs associated with the measurement and monitoring of actual nonpoint
sources loads are also identified as economic barriers in water quality trading
programs (Breetz et al., 2004). These costs can curtail the expected savings in
meeting water quality goals. Although direct measurement of nonpoint source
discharges could be very expensive, current technologies provide less costly
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alternatives to estimate effluent load reduction. For example, computer models, such
as the Watershed Assessment Model (WAM), Soil and Water Assessment Tool
(SWAT), and the Agricultural Policy/Environmental Extender (APEX) model (Soil
and Water Engineering Technology, Inc. (SWET), 2010; APEX, 2011; SWAT, 2011),
calculate site-specific effluent loads based on land use, soil type, topography, and
weather conditions. These simulation models are relatively simple to use, reliable, and
offer the possibility to simulate several scenarios before any control measure is
actually implemented (Arnold et al., 1998; Gassman et al., 2010; Chebud et al.,
2011). However, it is important to be aware of the limitations, assumptions, and
degree of uncertainty of these computer tools. Site-specific measurements and
monitoring of nonpoint source loads should be conducted whenever possible to
validate simulation results.
Online market tools have also been developed for several water quality trading
programs to estimate the amount of credits generated based on the adopted control
practices (Hennessy, 2001). For instance, in the Chesapeake Bay, the World Resource
Institute (WRI) in conjunction with environmental agencies have designed a sitespecific online trading platform called NutrientNet (World Resources Institute (WRI),
2007). This tool is used to estimate the nutrient reductions achieved when
implementing a certain type of mitigation practices, to post credit offers, and to
provide a simple communicating platform among buyers and sellers. Another
example of an online tool is the Nitrogen Tracking Tool (NTrT), an enhanced version
of the Nitrogen Trading Tool (NTT) originally developed by the Natural Resources
Conservation Service (NRCS) in cooperation with the Agricultural Research Service
and the USEPA. The NTrT estimates nitrogen, phosphorus and sediment reductions
and losses from fields managed under a variety of cropping patterns and management
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practices. This tool helps farmers and other users to estimate the potential number of
nitrogen and phosphorus credits to be generated and eventually sold in a water quality
trading program, when a specific control program is implemented (Gross et al., 2008;
Saleh et al., 2011). These simulation tools along with scientific research on nonpoint
source loadings and BMP efficiencies might reduce the uncertainty ratios, therefore
decreasing the cost of nonpoint source credits and making them more attractive to
point sources (Ribaudo and Gottlieb, 2011).
Another economic barrier is related to the high transaction costs associated with
research, negotiations, monitoring and enforcement, and finding trading partners
(Stavins, 2003). The real challenge with transaction costs is to retain the cost
effectiveness while still meeting environmental efficacy (Woodward et al., 2002).
Given that nonpoint sources are generally widely spread throughout watersheds and
each farmer would be able to generate few credits, point sources would encounter
high transaction costs while searching for trading partners to comply with their
requirements and thus hold back trading with nonpoint sources (Ribaudo and Gottlieb,
2011). Likewise, nonpoint sources may face high transaction costs when trying to
identify sources interested to buy their credits. Nevertheless, a number of trading
programs have implemented market configuration features such as clearinghouses and
third-party aggregators to reduce the transaction costs (Breetz et al., 2004). These
third-party aggregators are brokers between buyers and sellers, purchasing credits
from sellers and then re-selling the credits to willing buyers. Having third-party
aggregators in a trading program can minimize the transaction costs while also
reducing the uncertainty issue associated to nonpoint sources performance by holding
a portion of the purchased credits and taking the risk if a nonpoint source control
practice fails to generate the expected credits (Ribaudo and Gottlieb, 2011). Figure 2-
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1 summarizes the key challenges and benefits of water quality programs, as well as
some of the suggested solutions discussed above.
2.5. Elements of a Water Quality Trading Program
Water quality trading programs may have different designs reflecting the water
quality goals and the physical characteristics of each watershed (Borisova and Roka,
2009). Nevertheless, there are some common elements to be implemented pre and
post trading (summarized in Figure 2-2) that can be assembled differently to tailor
each program needs. Table 2-3 presents a brief description of some trading programs
and elements of the corresponding policies. Although many of these trading programs
share common features, this paper details only some representative trading policies
providing different design and implementation options. All of these trading programs
are located in the United States and in Canada (Figure 2-3) with the exception of the
Hunter River Trading Scheme located in Australia (not shown on the map).
Tradable commodity
For a trading system to work, the tradable commodity needs to be expressed in a
common unit of measurement for a specific pollutant form (typically kilograms per
day or year) in order to quantify and track effluent reductions and enforce discharge
limits (Swift, 2005). Careful attention needs to be given to the chemical form of the
traded pollutant since different pollutants have different chemical characteristics and
their interaction and impact on the water body of concern may differ (USEPA, 1996).
In addition, the certification, verification, and enforcement conditions of the tradable
commodity are to be determined during the designing phase of the trading program.
Many worldwide water quality trading programs are focused on phosphorus
and/or nitrogen, although inclusion of different pollutants, such as sediment and
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salinity into water quality trading policies has been growing. For instance,
Pennsylvania's Chesapeake Bay Water Quality Trading program addresses pollution
reductions for nitrogen, phosphorus and sediment to meet water quality standards in
the Bay and tidal rivers (USEPA, 2010); and the Hunter River Trading Scheme in
Australia, provides a mechanism where point sources trade salinity credits in order to
reduce and maintain salinity levels in the river (Department of Environment, Climate
Change and Water (DECCW), 2009).
Types of trading, eligibility, and baseline
In addition to addressing different pollutants, these programs illustrate different
types of trading as well. Most programs allow only one type of trading, either between
point sources or between nonpoint sources, the former being the most prevalent type.
However, there are programs (e.g. Neuse River and Great Miami River) allowing
trading between point and nonpoint sources, such as trading between agriculture
landowners and wastewater treatment plants, and other programs (e.g. Lower St.
Johns River pilot program located in Florida, USA) permitting trading between urban
stormwater and waste treatment facilities.
An important element to consider in any trading program is the determination of
trading eligibility. Since a successful program requires an adequate level of credit
supply and demand (USEPA, 2004), a preliminary assessment of the type and number
of sources located across the watershed needs to be performed. This preliminary
assessment of the market's potential while identifying potential sources that may
participate in a trading program include: 1) characterization of effluent loadings, 2)
proximity to the receiving water body, 3) whether or not they already have pollutant
limit requirements, 4) their pollution reduction cost and, 5) their willingness to
participate in the program (Obropta and Rusciano, 2006). A substantial difference of
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pollution abatement costs among sources within a watershed is another key factor to
be considered (Collentine, 2006; FDEP, 2010a). This will provide financial incentives
for sellers, to have an additional revenue stream while generating and selling credits
in the market, and for buyers to save on pollution control costs while purchasing
credits from the market (Borisova and Roka, 2009).
The concept of baseline arises when nonpoint sources are involved in a trading
program. A baseline is the level of performance against which changes create credits
for sale in a market; this means that a seller needs to reduce below its baseline to be
able to generate credits (Ribaudo and Gottlieb, 2011). Baseline determination differs
among water quality trading programs and can be set based either on loads recorded
during a specific period, (Hamstead and BenDor, 2010), or on load reduction through
a TMDL (Borisova and Roka, 2009), or on agriculture pollution control practices
implemented before trading (Ribaudo et al., 2005). As an example, the baseline for
nitrogen in the Neuse River Basin program was set based on the 1991-1995 annual
average nitrogen loadings.
Goal and allowances
The goal refers to the total permissible amount of a pollutant allowed to be
discharged into a water body in a given period of time. Generally defined as the cap, it
is the leading driver that propels pollution sources to seek effluent reductions. Usually
a TMDL or a water quality-based requirement in a NPDES permit are the legal
mechanisms establishing target conditions in a water quality trading program (FDEP,
2010b). Scientific research provides estimates of the total amount of a pollutant that
can be discharged into a specific watershed, while still meeting its designated uses.
After the cap is set, discharge allowances are determined for pollutant sources across
the watershed. These allowances will establish the baseline for individual sources to
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generate credits to trade (Shabman and Stephenson, 2007). Generally, while the
allocations to point sources are reflected in a binding requirement in the NPDES
permit, no emission restriction are imposed on nonpoint sources by federal law
(USEPA, 2004).
Policy and regulation
There are also some differences in the policy driver that motivates pollution
sources to seek credits to comply with their pollutant limit requirements. Among the
programs presented in Table 2-3, the primary water quality driver was the adoption of
a TMDL and more stringent discharge limits in the NPDES permits (e.g. Long Island
Sound or Lower St. Johns River trading programs). Other programs defined their
reduction targets through a general permit providing flexibility in pollution control
measures and not forcing point sources to comply with their individual NPDES
permits, as long as the group cap is met (e.g. Neuse River Basin trading program).
However, in this case, if the collective cap is exceeded, the group is penalized with a
fee to secure equivalent load reductions from sources not covered under the group
permit (Stephenson and Shabman, 2010).
International water quality trading drivers were based on different guidelines. For
example, the Provincial Ministry of Environment (MOE) in Canada required zero
phosphorus discharge for new or expanded facilities (O'Grady, 2006). In the case of
the Hunter River Salinity Scheme in Australia, established to limit salinity discharges
from major point sources, the total allowable salt discharge depends on the river flow
and its capacity to assimilate saline discharges (Ferguson, 2005).
Trading ratios
Generally, water quality trading programs rely on trading ratios to account for
uncertainties and to achieve equivalency among the traded credits, particularly when
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nonpoint sources are participating in the program (USEPA, 2008). The most common
trading ratios are the delivery, uncertainty, water quality, retirement, and reserve
ratios.
The delivery (or location) ratio is set to account for pollutant attenuation
throughout a watershed before reaching the impaired water body. This ratio can be
applied to point and nonpoint sources while considering their location and distance
from the impaired water body. Generally, the greater the distance the pollutant has to
travel, the greater the pollutant attenuation will be (CPNT, 2001). Therefore, by
implementing this delivery trading ratio, trading between sources at different
locations does not infringe on the overall watershed cap (Borisova and Roka, 2009).
The uncertainty ratio is set to account for seasonal loading variability and for the
uncertainties related to nonpoint source control practices efficiencies. It is set to
compensate for the lack of scientific measurement of nonpoint sources loadings and
BMP reduction efficiencies. The most commonly adopted ratio is 2:1, set based on
BMPs reduction potentials rather than on measured values. Other studies are reporting
that lower trading ratios (less than 1:1) should be used particularly when nonpoint
sources BMPs reduction uncertainty is greater than point sources control mechanisms
uncertainty (Horan and Shortle, 2005).
A water quality ratio may be used to require additional reductions and ensure
more progress toward the attainment of water quality goals (CPNT, 2001). This ratio
is also set to account for situations when sensitive areas such as wetlands or lakes may
require additional water quality considerations. Generally, a percentage of the
available credits is retained to reflect the pollution source location relative to sensitive
areas.
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The retirement ratio provides a safety margin for the overall trading program. A
percentage of all credits generated may be discounted or retired before any trades are
negotiated to enhance the potential water quality benefits of the program. These ratios
cannot be sold to offset new loads (Selman et al., 2009).
The reserve ratio requires a portion of the total credits generated to be reserved to
provide insurance for failed pollution reduction practices. These credits are placed in
a reserve fund to be drawn from when purchased credits default. This ratio adds
another level of protection to the credits but does not account for the nonpoint sources
reduction efficiency uncertainty (PADEP, 2009; Selman et al., 2009).
Most of the water quality trading programs include trading ratios such as in Long
Island Sound where a delivery trading ratio of 1.0 was given to the zones with the
greatest impact on the dissolved oxygen levels and a ratio of 0.14 was given to areas
with less influence on the hypoxia zone (CTDEP, 2010a). In other words, if the seller
is located in a trading ratio zone of 1 and the buyer is in a trading ratio zone of 0.14,
the delivery trading ratio is 1:0.14. This means that the seller would need to remove 1
unit of nitrogen in order to compensate 0.14 units of nitrogen generated by the buyer.
A ratio combining the attenuation and uncertainty factors could also be used as in the
case of the South Nation River where the MOE requires a 4:1 ratio, meaning that 4 kg
of phosphorus must be removed by nonpoint sources for every 1 kg of phosphorus
discharged from point sources (O'Grady, 2011). Different ratios could also be used as
in the case of the Pennsylvania Water Quality Trading Program containing three
different types of ratios: delivery, reserve, and edge-of-segment (EOS) (Branosky et
al., 2011).
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Market structure and credit price
The market structure specifies trading conditions and covers all guidelines and
rules needed for a successful and transparent trading program (Stephenson and
Shabman, 1997). Generally, trading markets fall in four main categories: 1)
clearinghouses, 2) bilateral negotiations, 3) exchange markets, and 4) sole source
offset (USEPA, 2008).
The most common market structure used to support the trading program is the
clearinghouse market, where there is an intermediary between the credits seller and
buyer (Woodward et al., 2002). The Neuse River and the Great Miami River
programs used a clearinghouse entity to translate nutrient credits with variable prices
into a uniform commodity, thus reducing transaction costs and mitigating the buyer
risk for potential pollution reduction failure (Selman et al., 2009). The Neuse River
trading program uses an association of the dischargers to coordinate the trade activity.
In the case of the Great Miami River program, the Miami Conservancy District
(MCD) serves as a third party broker acquiring credits through contractual agreements
with entities subsidizing agricultural producers applying specific BMPs (such as
conservation tillage, rotation, pasture seeding/prescribed grazing, etc.) and selling
voluntary pollution reduction to regulated sources under a different contractual
agreement (Breetz et al., 2004; Bacon and Dupuis, 2011; Newburn and Woodward,
2012). Bilateral trading is another common market structure where there is direct
contact between trading partners to exchange information and bargain the terms of the
trade, with a public authority participating to approve the negotiation and set suitable
trading ratios (USEPA, 2008). In this case, the credit price is reached through a
negotiation process, and not by simply checking or noticing an existing credit price on
the market (Woodward et al., 2002). This bilateral structure increases transaction
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costs and also the contractual links between trading partners. Exchange markets are
less common given the high initial cost incurred to establish the infrastructure
allowing the exchange of information, communication and transactions between
buyers and sellers. Online marketplaces, such as NutrientNet used in the Pennsylvania
trading program, have been successful for tracking credits, providing transparency,
monitoring trading activities, and facilitating market participants to find each other
(Hennessy, 2001; WRI, 2007; Selman et al., 2009). In the Hunter River program, a biannual auction is conducted whereby the New South Wales Environmental Protection
Agency (NSW EPA) auctions 200 new salinity credits every two years, with a 10 year
life-span, regardless of whether they are sold at the auction or retained by the
Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water (DECCW). This auction
process allows equal participation and potential access to the credits for all bidders
including new participants to the market (stakeholders, environmental agencies, etc.)
(DECCW, 2009). While the auctions occur every two years, the program scheme
supports bilateral trading at any time (Ferguson, 2005). It is worth noticing that
because the program's location in a semi-arid region, the total allowable salt discharge
depends on the river flow and its capacity to assimilate saline discharges. For
instance, no discharge is allowed during periods of low flow, a limited discharge is
permitted during periods of high flow, and an unlimited discharge is allowed during
flood periods (Ferguson, 2005). A less common market structure is the sole source
offset, which takes place when a source is allowed to offset their pollution loadings
either on-site or by taking reduction loading activities off-site. Here, there is not
trading involved (Selman et al., 2009).
The range of credit prices is indicated in Table 2-3 and generally depends on
several factors (indicated in Figure 2-2) such as the market structure and the trading
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program policy, the transaction and monitoring costs, the construction and operation
costs to remove the pollutant, and the cost of implementing BMPs or other
remediation technologies. It is noteworthy that the credit price principally depends on
the market rules of supply and demand. When the number of point sources buying
credits increases, credit prices increase as well.
Accountability and assistance
Every trading program must have an administrative system that oversees the
monitoring and reporting of pollution reductions with enforcement capabilities. Legal
liability and responsibility when effluent reductions are not met must be clearly
addressed with specific fees and penalties (Woodward et al., 2002). The
administrative entity plays a key role in the implementation and management of a
trading program. State agencies should also commit to assume additional economic
and regulatory responsibilities associated with the trading program (Keplinger et al.,
2004; Borisova and Roka, 2009). Trading partners need also to be assisted throughout
the trade negotiations. Some of the actions to facilitate the trades include: 1)
identification of sellers and buyers, 2) helping potential point and nonpoint sources
understand the trading policy, 3) tracking production, use, and durability of credits,
and 4) regularly updating information regarding credit availability, prices and
interested trading partners (CPNT, 2001).
Stakeholder engagement
A successful education and outreach program is important in a water quality
trading program. Interested parties (e.g., federal, state and local government, local
businesses, universities, and interested citizens) need to be involved and engaged
during all stages of the trading program. Potential participants are to be identified and
encouraged to participate in order to guarantee a viable water quality trading program

30

(King and Kuch, 2003). Several studies investigated the essential role of trust and
effective communication with local environmental agencies and its impact on
increasing trading partner participation (Mariola, 2009). An example of a successful
communication program was developed within the Great Miami River program,
where longstanding relationships between environmental agents in the watershed and
farmers was cited as an important factor to achieve high rates of farmers involvement
(Newburn and Woodward, 2012). Moreover, conducted surveys indicated that the
nonpoint source initial participation (willingness to understand, discuss and
participate) in a trading program is contingent with the degree of trust in program
administrators (Breetz et al., 2005).
2.6. Meta-Analysis of Water Quality Trading Programs
Several authors attempted to define a trading program success using different
approaches (Breetz et al., 2005; Mariola, 2009; Newburn and Woodward, 2012). An
economic approach would define success as a function of market efficiency, low
transaction costs, and tools for minimizing uncertainty. Another approach would
define success as whether or not a program has resulted in the implementation of
agricultural BMPs, directly relating success to social relations between market
participants (Mariola, 2009). In the first approach, water quality trading programs are
analyzed using a set of economic and institutional variables without accounting for
the social aspect (stakeholders and farmers participation) of this type of program. The
second approach, defining success based on social embeddedness or on the sole
implementation of BMPs, would also be missing the basic definition of a market
driven approach.
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In this paper, acknowledging the need for an adequate market structure and the
importance of social interactions among participants, the success of a trading program
involving point and agricultural nonpoint sources was defined as the ease of making
trades while taking into account the enhancement of social relationships among
participants affecting the willingness to participate. However, it should be noted that
even if a trading program was considered here as successful (and had all the
components to facilitate trading), polluting sources could decide not to trade.
Moreover, attainment of water quality goals was not considered here as a measure of
success since, for most of the trading programs herein evaluated, the realized loading
reductions could not be explicitly and exclusively linked to the trading program
implementation. Furthermore, cost saving was also not considered here as a success
measure since a detailed economic analysis was lacking in most of the evaluated
trading programs. As an alternative, the structure of water quality trading markets was
considered as it plays a key role on how trading partners respond to pursuing
achievement of water quality goals and also on the cost effectiveness of the program.
The economic / social definition of success considered here takes into account the
economic aspect of trading activities, highlighting the need for an open information
structure to facilitate trading. Indeed, the difficulty of creating an effective and
smoothly operating market place where trading partners can identify each other
(social aspect), find information and engage in negotiations, is the reason for high
transaction costs and market stagnancy (Shabman and Stephenson, 2007). In fact, in
some cases, even with financial and policy drivers, farmers remain unwilling to
participate in water trading activities. Enhancing social relationships is critical for the
success of trading programs. Social relationships and networks could be classified as
embedded or at arms-length (Uzzi, 1999). Arm's-length ties function without any
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prolonged social contact between parties and do not require any extended
communication or social contracts. In embedded ties, information exchanges between
actors are dependent on social attachments that produce expectations of trust and
reciprocity – important elements of water quality trading programs. These high levels
of trust and reciprocity facilitate the sharing of private information (Adali et al.,
2012). In a water quality trading program, embedded relationships create a unique
value and motivate exchange partners to share the value of their mutual benefits
through transfer of private resources and self-enforcing governance (Uzzi, 1997).
Table 2-4 summarizes 10 trading programs involving point and agricultural
nonpoint sources. It illustrates a diverse array of approaches to solving watershed
water quality problems. Each program was evaluated based on the established
structure for searching partners and for bargaining. Programs with an exchange
market or a clearinghouse structure were assessed as having a trading framework that
simplifies the trading of credits, because of their lower transaction costs, while
offering an open information structure (with an enhanced education outreach
program) and creating embedded relationships among trading partners facilitating the
interactions between buyers and sellers without increasing the transaction costs.
Based on this definition of success, and from the 10 cases evaluated here, six were
categorized as successful. Some of them are in agreement with results published
elsewhere (USEPA, 2008; Mariola, 2009; Newburn and Woodward, 2012). The Rahr
Malting Company program was evaluated as not successful because of the heavy
market structure - designing a permit and trading framework, negotiations with
landowners, writing detailed contracts, and monitoring the implementation of
nonpoint source controls – leading to high transaction costs. Breetz et al., (2004)
reported that the high administration and transaction cost as the major obstacle for the
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ease of trading for this Rahr Malting Company program. In the case of the Lower St.
Johns program, it is up to the seller to find a willing buyer with an individual NPDES
permit, thus increasing transaction costs associated with the identification of trading
partners. It is important to highlight that this is a relatively new program with only a
few formal credit trades, mainly due to the uncertainty about the upcoming new
numeric nutrient limits that facilities would have to meet. A lower trading ratio before
the implementation of the nutrient limits would have encouraged the trading
(following the Great Miami River trading program example).
In order to determine the variables with the strongest effect on the success or
failure of water quality trading programs, a meta-data analysis was conducted using
the 10 trading programs (Table 2-4). This statistical assessment was based on a
binomial correlation methodology used by Mariola (2009) and explained below. This
approach was selected because of statistical limitations imposed when having a small
number of case studies. Independent and dependent variables were classified into a
binomial form, constructing a 'truth table', in which the absence or presence of each
independent variable was evaluated based on their contribution to the dependent
outcome. This quasi-quantitative approach is provided insights on the correlation
between variables and the success of a trading program. The selected independent
variables driving our definition of a program success are policy drivers, minimization
of uncertainty, flexibility, trading activity, and social embeddedness. It is worth
noticing that measures of success selected by Mariola (2009) were policy drivers,
trading ratio < 2:1 (a tool for minimizing uncertainty), market freedom or flexibility
and social embeddedness while assessing a trading program success between point
and nonpoint agricultural sources. The measures of success selected in this paper to
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conduct the meta-analysis were similar to those used by Mariola (2009) but the
variables were differently defined as detailed below.
Table 2-4 presents the five independent variables matched with the 10 selected
water quality trading programs. Each program was labelled with a (+) or (-) score
based on how they influence the easiness of trading. The final row of the table lists
the binomial correlation coefficients (BCC) linking the trading programs and each
respective independent variable. These coefficients represent the degree of association
between each variable and the success of a trading program as it is defined earlier in
this review.
Policy drivers
The policy drivers can be in the form of binding obligations, such as TMDLs,
NPDES permits or nutrient criteria, or in the form of incentives (whenever nutrient
requirements have not been imposed). Policy drivers are a key element motivating
point and nonpoint sources to participate in a trading program, thus affecting the
'willingness to participate', a success factor of the trading programs. In Table 2-4, a
program with a policy driver was allocated a (+) score and a program without a policy
driver or with an inadequate cap was allocated a negative (-) score. Inadequate caps
refer to setting a binding regulation that is either too high or too low. Programs with
other drivers different than a policy one, were allocated a '(+/-)' score if the program
has resulted in significant demand for pollution reduction credits. An example of a
program without a policy driver is the Great Miami River trading program that
emerged before stricter state-wide nutrient limits and watershed TMDLs were in
place. This program encouraged facilities (under threat of regulation) to purchase
phosphorus credits generated through voluntary and less costly nonpoint source
reductions (Water Conservation Sub-district of the Miami Conservation District
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(WCS), 2005). Despite the absence of a regulatory obligation, this program has been
successful in creating a large credit supply and a high number of agricultural
abatement funded projects (Newburn and Woodward, 2012).
Minimization of uncertainty
The uncertainty associated with nonpoint sources BMPs efficiencies and
monitoring is one of the most cited barriers responsible for a limited success of a
water quality trading program. This factor is a key element affecting the 'willingness
to participate' of sources in a trading program. Therefore, the 10 programs were
evaluated based on the methods used to calculate the credits generated by nonpoint
sources by implementing a specific management practice. Some trading programs
have developed their own tools (NutrientNet for Pennsylvania and STEPL Spreadsheet Tool for Estimating Pollution Loads for the Great Miami River) based on
scientifically sound modeling, and others have required monitoring for the
verification of load reductions. Programs falling in either case were assigned a (+)
score, because they reduce the uncertainty attributed to nonpoint sources, hence
increasing the willingness of participation and easiness of trading. The South Nation
River program was assigned a (+/-) score (intermediary score) because it relies on
published documents to calculate the amount of phosphorus removed by different
BMPs (O'Grady, 2011). This method of pre-determined nutrient reductions,
regardless of location, is less accurate than site-specific calculations (Selman et al.,
2009). The Lower St. Johns program was also assigned a (+/-) score because it does
not require the use of any specific and standardized tool for credit calculation, which
is currently based on estimates of adjustment factors, to address the uncertainty.
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Flexibility
Programs offering flexibility (impacting the ease of trading) for pollution sources
to implement technologies to control their pollution were allocated a (+) score. For
instance, the South Nation River Watershed program was allocated a (+) score
because it clearly states that it is up to the discharger to develop and implement the
most cost-effective method to reduce phosphorus loadings. In contrast, other
programs (assigned a (-) score) are somehow constrained by the already evaluated and
available BMPs. However, if the program allows sources to propose new mitigation
practices to be considered as eligible activities to generate credits were given a (+/-)
score.
Trading activity
This criterion was evaluated positively if credits were traded during the program
duration – a direct indication of the ease of trading. Trades occurring as a result of
point source emission offset by implementation of nonpoint BMPs were also
considered. A negative evaluation was given to programs, such as the Tar-Pamlico
trading program (North Carolina, USA), because by implementing several operational
measures and minor capital improvements by point sources, the nutrient reduction
goals were reached without the need for credit trading.
Social embeddedness
This variable evaluated how trading programs alleviate social constraints, such as
lack of trust, communication, and participation among stakeholders. Programs with
established communication mechanisms (e.g. education and outreach, use of existing
relationships, and creation of information sharing channels), were assessed to be
socially embedded, with a positive (+) score. Lack of these mechanisms hinders the
identification of trading opportunities and makes it more difficult to exchange credits
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and thus increasing the transaction costs. It is important to note that these are
communication mechanisms, not programs structures. One positive example is the
Miami River Watershed trading program using the Miami Conservancy District
(MCD) as a clearinghouse for wastewater treatment plants, participants, and farmers.
This program has been able to use a pre-existing network of relationships and
institutional infrastructure to disseminate information and recruit participants
(Newburn and Woodward, 2012).
The binomial correlation coefficients (BCC) (Table 2-4) revealed that
minimization of uncertainty is highly correlated to the trading program success
definition (BCC=0.85). The nonpoint source load reduction estimation using sitemonitoring or modeling techniques is crucial for enhancing participation of point
sources. Likewise, the meta-analysis indicated that policy drivers (BCC=0.8) are
correlated to the trading program success definition given that they represent the first
motivation for the implementation of and participation in a trading program. Social
embeddedness (BCC=0.7) also showed to be significant for the functionality of a
program. Trusted social relationships are needed to reduce concerns of nonpoint
sources about impacts of risk and equity on benefits and responsibilities, to decrease
transaction costs, and to create a more efficient market.
2.7. Conclusions
Increased regulatory interest in controlling pollutants causing the impairment of
water bodies has stimulated the growth of water quality trading programs. Advocates
of this initiative claim that market-based trading programs provide an additional tool
for solving watershed-based water quality problems. Cost effectiveness, decision
making flexibility, involvement of non-regulated pollution sources, and technological
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advancements for abatement verification and market transactions are also highlighted
as factors contributing to the development of water quality trading programs.
Recognizing the benefits, challenges, and key elements associated with these types of
programs is the first step for an effective program design. Furthermore, understanding
the drivers for the pollution reduction achievement is essential to guarantee sufficient
trading activity. The watershed goal and the associated allocations are the foundation
of a well structured trading program. A successful trading system carefully assesses
conditions such as pollutant suitability, financial attractiveness, feasible market
structures, and stakeholder willingness. In addition, the meta-analysis conducted using
several water quality trading case studies revealed that minimization of uncertainty,
policy drivers, and social embeddedness are the most significant variables influencing
the success of a trading program. It is noteworthy that a program success is not solely
based on providing economic incentives, nor having a structure that minimizes
transaction cost, nor is it solely based on having regulatory drivers. Rather it is an
interaction among all these variables, handled properly within each program, that
makes a program successful. Although water quality trading programs face
regulatory, technical and economic challenges, there are viable approaches to
overcome these barriers and effectively implement a water quality trading program.
Many of the challenges that emerge during the design and implementation of the
program can be solved if innovative thinking is introduced.
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2.10. Tables
Table 2-1. Advantages of water quality trading programs.
Cost-effective approach to attain water quality standards
Improved compliance levels
Environmental

Implementation of innovative technologies to reduce water pollution levels
below the requirements
Ancillary and indirect ecological benefits
Reduced individual pollution abatement cost
Reduced aggregate cost of achieving water quality goals in the watershed

Economic

Financial incentives and flexibility on how to control effluent reductions
Market demand for new innovative technologies
Funding for new methodologies for emission prevention and control
Encourage communication among trading partners, regulatory agencies, public
and other stakeholders

Social

Shared responsibility and commitment for water quality pollution control
Population growth considered while achieving water quality objectives

Table 2-2. Challenges of water quality trading programs.
Lack of regulatory liabilities for nonpoint sources
Lack of education and awareness among regulated communities
Regulatory

Limited support from federal and state environmental agencies
A preconceived skepticism from regulatory agencies
Lengthy permitting process
Creation of hotspots, localized areas with high pollution levels
Need for additional scientific data to evaluate the trading ratios

Uncertainty

Nonpoint source effluent reductions
Lack of trust among trading partners and regulatory agencies

Economic

Potential participants do not have a clear understanding of the marked-based
programs
Cost associated with the quantification and monitoring of nonpoint sources
loadings
High transaction costs incurred when identifying trading partners, negotiating
and exchanging information
Sufficient credit demand and supply

Program
Design

Cost / price dynamics supporting a market
Geographic restrictions
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Table 2-3. Summary of some examples of water quality trading programs.
Program

Pollutant
/Trading
type

Goals

1. Neuse River
Basin TN
Trading Program,
NC, USA

TN /
PS-PS
PS-NPS

Collective
NPDES permit
(30% reduction
or allowable 485
mtons/yr)

TN /
PS-PS

Multi-state
TMDL (58.5 %
reduction) and
General NPDES
Permit

TN, TP /
PS-PS
PS-NPS

Allowable:
TMDL mtons/yr
Freshwater:
TN = 8,572
TP = 500
Estuary:
TN = 1,377

2. Long Island
Sound TN Credit
Exchange
Program, CT,
USA

3. Lower St.
Johns River Pilot
Water
Quality
Trading Program,
FL, USA

Ratios

U

D

D&U

Credit Price
(US$/kg)

US$ 24.262.5

US$ 3.6-10

US$ 151.8
for TP
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Market
Structure

C

C

B, ThP

Observations

References

- 23 facilities trade within a group
compliance association to meet an
overall cap for TN.
- 69 % reduction of TN loads to the
estuary since 1995.
- 50 % reduction of the TN daily
loads from 79 facilities.
- Potential savings with TN trading
are in the US$300M-400M range
over individual permitting
approaches.
- During 2002-2009,
approximately 15.5 million credits
were traded, representing
US$45.9M in economic activity.
- Two types of trading were
allowed, before and after BMAP
adoption.
- All credits exchange has been
from WWTF to MS4s.
- There has been only one credit
exchange with money involved.

(USEPA,
2008;
Hamstead and
BenDor,
2010)

(USEPA,
2008;
CTDEP,
2010b)

(FDEP,
2010a; LSJR
TMDL
Executive
Committee,
2011)

Table 2-3. Continued.
Program

4. Great Miami
River Watershed
Trading Pilot,
OH, USA

5. Pennsylvania
Water Quality
Trading Program,
PA, USA

Pollutant
/Trading
type

Goals

TP, TN /
PS-PS
PS-NPS

A TMDL is in
place for one of
the three subwatersheds, and
TMDLs are
under
development for
the remaining
two subwatersheds

TN, TP,
sediment /
PS-NPS

Allowable:
TMDL
(mtons/yr)
TN = 33,534 TP
= 1,329
Sediment =
899,823

Ratios

D, R

D, R, EOS

Credit Price
(US$/kg)

Cost estimate
range
(combined
TN & TP)
US$ 0.7-28.2

For TN:
US$ 6.6-33.1
For TP:
US$ 8.8-22
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Market
Structure

Observations

References

C, ThP

- The clearinghouse (credit bank)
was capitalized with money from
grants and from PS purchasing
credits. Farmers providing the
greatest TP reductions at the least
cost are funded from the credit
bank. Credits were then allocated
to investors based on their initial
investment amount.
- Create incentives (lower trading
ratios) for WWTFs that fund
nutrient reductions in advance of
their permit requirements.
- A total of 49 projects have been
funded, with payments totaling
US$ 937,550. The projects have
produced 326 mtons in TP
reductions.
- Estimate cost savings of US$
314M - 384M during a 20-year
period compared with traditional
approaches.

(Kieser &
Associates,
2004; Graziani,
2007; Hall,
2009)

EM, C

- 55 projects have been approved.
Approximately 1.7 million TN
credits and 202,000 TP credits.
- Online trading tool (NutrientNet)
used to register, as a marketplace
and credit estimation tool.

(PADEP,
2009;
USEPA,
2010;
Branosky et
al., 2011;
PADEP,
2011)

Table 2-3. Continued.

Program

6. South Nation
River Watershed
Trading Program,
Canada

Pollutant
/Trading
type

TP /
PS-NPS

Goals

Allowable:
Zero increase in
TP loads for new
or expanded
WWTF

Ratios

Combined
U&D

Credit Price
(US$/kg)

Project
average cost:
US$ 410
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Market
Structure

Observations

References

(O'Grady,
2006, 2011)

C

- This program allows TP loading
offsetting from new or expanding
WWTFs by implementing NPS
BMPs.
- A fund allocates money to
farmers to pay for BMPs that
generate credits. The farmers are
paid for their projects and not to
reach kg of TP removed.
- PS may purchase credits from the
fund to offset their increased P
discharge.
- 269 verifiable trades were
completed from 2000 to 2009. The
estimated annual TP removal ~
10,000 kg

Table 2-3. Continued.
Program

7. Hunter River
Salinity Trading
Scheme,
Australia

Pollutant
/Trading
type

Salinity /
PS-PS

Goals

Allowable:
900 EC (lower
and middle
sector)
600 EC (upper
sector)

Ratios

N/A

Credit Price
(US$/kg)

US$526-983
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Market
Structure

Observations

References
(DECCW,
2003;
Ferguson,
2005;
DECCW,
2009)

EM, B

- Participants include 23 coal
mining and power generation
facilities, holding a total of 1,000
salinity credits.
- The initial credits are issued with
different life spans (200 credits
expire every 2 years) and then
using a public auction to distribute
200 credits every 2 years.
- During high flow conditions,
each credit allows a discharger to
release up to 0.1% of the Total
Allowable Discharge or sell the
credit to another participating
facility over the scheme's online
trading platform. During low flow
conditions, no discharges are
allowed, and during flood
conditions discharges are
unrestricted.
- Participants can continue to
purchase credits from other credit
holders as needed after the auction,
using the online trading website.

Table 2-3. Continued.
Program

8. Tar-Pamlico
Nutrient Trading
Program, NC,
USA

Pollutant
/Trading
type

TN, TP /
PS-PS PSNPS

Goals

Ratios

Credit Price
(US$/kg)

Allowable:
TMAL
(mtons/yr)
TN = 400
TP = 70

U, R

Phase I:
US$ 55.1
Phase II:
US$ 28.7

Goals

Ratios

Credit Price
(US$/kg)

Market
Structure

Observations

References
(Gannon, 2003;
Breetz et al.,
2004; Bacon
and Dupuis,
2011)

C

- Point sources would meet nutrient
reduction goals by funding
agricultural BMPs.
- In Phase I: 16-member
association (94% of the point
sources discharging into the basin)
has a common TN and TP cap. In
Phase II: nonpoint sources were
charged with a voluntary 30%
nutrient reduction goal.
- Once PS have purchased credits,
they are no longer liable. The State
assumes responsibility for the
monitoring and verification of
BMPs. NPS in non-compliance
must return the cost-share funds.
- The Association has consistently
discharged below the nutrient cap
without engaging in trading.
- The program achieved its nutrient
reduction goal at a significantly
lower cost than initially projected.

Market
Structure

Observations

References

Table 2-3. Continued.
Program

Pollutant
/Trading
type
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Program

9. Rahr Malting
Company Permit,
MN, USA

10. Red Cedar
River Nutrient
Trading Pilot
Program, WI,
USA

Pollutant
/Trading
type

TN, TP,
sediment to
create
CBOD 5
credits /
PS-NPS

TP /
PS-NPS

Goals

Allowable:
24.9 mtons/yr of
CBOD 5 (68
kg/day)

Ratios

Nutrient
conversion
ratios to
CBOD 5 ,
D, U

Allowable:
2 mtons/yr

U

Goals

Ratios

Credit Price
(US$/kg)

US$ 18.9

US$ 4.1

Market
Structure

Solesource
offsets, B

B

Observations

References

- Rahr negotiated an agreement
with the Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency to offset
CBOD 5 discharged from its new
WWTF by funding upstream NPS
pollutant reductions.
- NPS BMP sites must be upstream
of Shakopee in the Minnesota
River Basin.
- Rahr was required to establish a
US$ 250,000 trust fund within the
5-year permit term to pay for its
NPS offsets. In 5 years, Rahr
achieved the needed NPS loading
reductions through 4 NPS offsets.
- The City of Cumberland POTW
used water quality trading to reduce
compliance costs (1 mg/L TP
discharge limit).
- Farmers can only receive payment
for a BMP for 3 years. As of 2004,
the City of Cumberland has paid a
total of US$ 58,000 to remove 14.3
mtons of TP.

(MPCA, 1997;
Breetz et al.,
2004; Selman
et al., 2009)

(Breetz et al.,
2004; Selman
et al., 2009)

Table 2-3. Continued.
Program

Pollutant
/Trading
type

Credit Price
(US$/kg)
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Market
Structure

Observations

References

Program

11. Virginia
Water Quality
Trading Program,
VA, USA

12. Cherry Creek
Reservoir
Watershed
Phosphorus
Trading Program,
CO, USA

Pollutant
/Trading
type

TN, TP /
PS-PS
PS-NPS

TP /
PS-PS
PS-NPS

Goals

General VPDES
permit.
Concentration
for annual WLAs
vary by river
basin

Allowable:
6 mtons/yr or
40 µg/L

Ratios

U

D, U

Credit Price
(US$/kg)

For TN:
US$ 24.4
For TP:
US$ 11.1

US$ 17,632
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Market
Structure

C, B

Solesource
offsets, C

Observations

References

- PS accommodate growth by
purchasing offsets in the form of
WLAs from other PS or offsets from
NPS.
- Sellers must meet baseline
requirements before selling offsets
and before generating credits.
Agricultural operations must first
comply with a state nutrient
reduction goal.
- There are 127 existing and 12
new/expanding facilities eligible for
participation.
- The trading program identifies two
types of projects: 1) New trade
projects allowing entities in the
watershed to construct NPS TP
projects for credit trading to respond
to the continued population growth,
and 2) Historic trade projects
including 4 projects constructed by
the water quality authority between
1991 and 1997. These projects made
up a 'phosphorus bank' of 98 kg of
credits, available for purchase.
- This (Department of Environmental
Quality, 2000) program has provided
ancillary environmental benefits such
as flood control and wildlife habitat.

(VDEQ,
2008;
Stephenso
n et al.,
2010)

(WERF,
2001;
Earles et
al., 2008)

Table 2-3. Continued.
Program

13. Kalamazoo
River Phosphorus
Trading
Demonstration
Program, MI,
USA

Pollutant
/Trading
type

TP /
PS-NPS

Goals

Allowable:
Steady WLA of
1 mg/L

Ratios

U

Credit Price
(US$/kg)

No credits
were
purchased

Market
Structure

Observations

References
(Kieser &
Associates,
2004)

C

- A multi-disciplinary steering
committee directs and oversees the
project.
- Six NPS projects were implemented
to generate credits for trading;
estimated load reduction is of 972 kg
of TP.
- PS could purchase credits to
accommodate growth but not to
discharge above their NPDES limits.
- No actual trades occurred because
the main PS discharger went out of
business.

B: Bilateral; BMAP: Basin Management Action Plan; BMPs: Best Management Practices;
C: Clearinghouse; CBOD 5 : Carbonaceous Biochemical Oxygen Demand;
D: Delivery ratio; EC: Electrical conductivity units; EM: Exchange market; EOS: Edge of segment factor;
MS4s: Municipal Separate Stormwater Sewer System; NPDES: National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System; NPS: Nonpoint sources;
POTW: Publicly Owned Treatment Works; PS: Point sources; R: Reserve ratio; ThP: Third party; TMAL: Total Maximum Annual Load; TN: Total
Nitrogen;
ThP: Third party; TP: Total Phosphorus; U: Uncertainty ratio; R: Reserve ratio; VPDES: Virginia Pollutant Discharge Elimination System;
WLAs: Waste Load Allocations; WWTF: Wastewater Treatment Facilities;
All the credit costs were converted to US$ (September 2011 currency converting rate). The credit price is reported per kg of pollutant removed (except for
the Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme, Australia).
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Table 2-4. Correlation between elements of a water quality trading program and the program success, involving point and
agricultural nonpoint sources.
Evaluation Criteria
Program

Policy
Drivers

Minimization
of
Uncertainty

Flexibility

Trading
Activity

Social
Embeddedness

Success
(ease of trading)

Great Miami River Watershed Trading Pilot
Pennsylvania Water Quality Trading
Program
Lower St. Johns River Pilot Water Quality
Trading Program
Kalamazoo River Phosphorus Trading
Demonstration Program
Red Cedar River Nutrient Trading Pilot
Program
South Nation River Watershed Trading
Program

+/-

+

+/-

+

+

+

+

+

+/-

+

+

+

+

+/-

+/-

+

+/-

-

-

+/-

+

-

+

+

+/-

+

-

+

+

-

+

+/-

+

+

+

+

Tar-Pamlico Nutrient Trading Program

+

+

+/-

-

+

+

Rahr Malting Company Permit
Cherry Creek Reservoir Watershed
Phosphorus Trading Program
Lower Boise River Effluent Trading
Demonstration Project

+

+

-

+

-

-

+

+

+/-

+

+

+

+

+

+/-

-

-

-

8

8.5

5

7

7

6

0.80

0.85

0.50

0.70

0.70

0.60

Total
Binomial Correlation
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2.11. Figures

Figure 2-1. Key benefits and challenges of water quality trading programs with some of
the suggested solutions.

Figure 2-2. Key elements of a water quality trading program, pre and post trading in a
temporal perspective.
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Figure 2-3. Locations of some water quality trading programs in North America. The
remaining water quality trading program discussed is located in Australia.
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CHAPTER 3
MODELING A PHOSPHORUS CREDIT TRADING PROGRAM IN AN
AGRICULTURAL WATERSHED
Corrales J, Naja GM, Bhat MG, Miralles-Wilhelm F. 2014. Modeling a phosphorus credit
trading program in an agricultural watershed. Journal of Environmental Management
143: 162-172.

3.1. Abstract
Water quality and economic models were linked to assess the economic and
environmental benefits of implementing a phosphorus credit trading program in an
agricultural sub-basin of Lake Okeechobee watershed, Florida, United States. The water
quality model determined the effects of rainfall, land use type, and agricultural
management practices on the amount of total phosphorus (TP) discharged. TP loadings
generated at the farm level, reaching the nearby streams, and attenuated to the sub-basin
outlet from all sources within the sub-basin, were estimated at 106.4, 91, and 85 mtons
yr-1, respectively. Almost 95% of the TP loadings reaching the nearby streams were
attributed to agriculture sources, and only 1.2% originated from urban areas, accounting
for a combined TP load of 87.9 mtons yr-1. In order to compare a Least-Cost Abatement
approach to a Command-and-Control approach, the most cost effective cap of 30% TP
reduction was selected, and the individual allocation was set at a TP load target of 1.6 kg
ha-1 yr-1 (at the nearby stream level). The Least-Cost Abatement approach generated a
potential cost savings of 27% ($1.3 million per year), based on an optimal credit price of
$179. Dairies (major buyer), ornamentals, row crops, and sod farms were identified as
potential credit buyers, whereas citrus, improved pastures (major seller), and urban areas
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were identified as potential credit sellers. Almost 81% of the TP credits available for
trading were exchanged. The methodology presented here can be adapted to deal with
different forms of trading sources, contaminants, or other technologies and management
practices.
3.2. Introduction
Nutrient over-enrichment of freshwater lakes, streams, and reservoirs is a rapidly
growing environmental problem, severely impacting freshwater resources worldwide.
Many of the world’s freshwater lakes suffer from eutrophication including Lake Erie and
Lake Okeechobee (United States), Lake Victoria (Tanzania/Uganda/Kenya), and Tai
Lake (China), among others. The rise in eutrophic events is generally attributed to the
rapid increase in intensive agricultural practices, industrial activities, and population
growth which have increased nutrient flows into the environment.
Lake Okeechobee, the largest lake in the southeastern United States (1890 km2), is
located in the center of the greater Florida Everglades ecosystem. It constitutes a critical
link between lakes and rivers to the north, wetlands and bays to the south, and estuaries to
the east and west. The environmental health of the Lake has been degraded as wetlands
and natural habitats in the Lake Okeechobee watershed have been replaced with farms,
urban areas, and dairy operations. Excessive phosphorus loadings from these diverse
sources – including agriculture and livestock, municipal and industrial wastewater
discharges, and urban stormwater runoff – have been identified as the leading causes of
the Lake’s impairment (FDEP, 2001). In order to protect the Lake and its designated uses
(e.g., drinking, fishing, recreation, irrigation), a phosphorus Total Maximum Daily Load
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(TMDL) for it was adopted in 2001. This TMDL establishes an annual target load of 140
mtons of total phosphorus (TP) to Lake Okeechobee, including atmospheric deposition
(35 mtons) and the sum of all TP-bearing surface water inputs to the Lake (105 mtons)
(Zhao et al., 2012). Watershed projects, along with on-site agricultural and urban Best
Management Practices (BMPs), are being implemented to reduce TP transport from
uplands and capture runoff during high rainfall periods. BMPs are individual or
combined management practices usually classified into management or structural
practices. Management practices, such as efficient use of fertilizers, are ownerimplemented BMPs. Structural practices involving the construction of more capitalintensive BMPs, are generally divided into typical practices (i.e., erosion control, etc.)
and alternative practices (i.e., edge-of-farm stormwater retention/detention, etc.)
(FDACS, 2011; SWET, 2006). Despite the high number of acres enrolled in the BMP
program, a large percentage of the lands have neither reached the full level of
typical/owner BMP implementation, nor have adopted more efficient alternative BMPs.
This is mainly due to lack of funding and to the high costs associated with more advanced
and efficient chemical treatments (FDACS, 2011). Consequently, the establishment of
innovative economic incentives is essential to drive landowners to implement BMPs to
their full extent.
Water quality trading programs have emerged as a promising alternative to assist in
meeting nutrient water quality standards at an overall lower cost (Corrales et al., 2013;
Kardos and Obropta, 2011). Studies conducted for the Great Miami River Watershed
Trading Pilot program and for the Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange reported
cost saving estimates of $314 to $385 million (Kieser & Associates, 2004) and $200
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million (CTDEP, 2010), respectively for each program. Trading allows one polluting
source to meet its regulatory obligations by using pollution reductions achieved by
another source with lower abatement costs (King and Kuch, 2003). The latter, in turn,
obtains revenue for their efforts in reducing pollution. Because trading programs are
expected to reduce the overall cost of complying with water quality goals, environmental
agencies have recently focused their effort on this type of programs over traditional
Command-and-Control approaches for water pollution control. Command-and-Control
approaches are generally cost-inefficient and consist of implementing technologies that
agencies deem to be most effective for controlling the amount of pollutant that may be
emitted by pollution sources, with violators facing rigid financial penalties (Field and
Field, 2006; Mariola, 2009; Paniccia, 2002).
The main objective of this study was to assess the economic and environmental
benefits of implementing a phosphorus environmental credit trading program, as
compared to a Command-and-Control approach. The S-191 sub-basin located within the
Lake Okeechobee watershed was selected as a model focus area. A computational
methodology coupling a water quality model to an economic model was developed in
order to identify P-credits buyers and sellers, determine the optimal credit price, and
assess the cost savings of a nutrient credits trading program. A complete trading scenario
was detailed to assess the cost-effectiveness of a water quality trading program in the
studied sub-basin. The specific objectives included simulating the optimal combination of
BMPs to minimize the cost of achieving a specific phosphorus reduction goal, assessing
the delivery trading ratios, and estimating the costs savings of a Least-Cost Abatement
scenario versus a Command-and-Control approach.
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3.3. Materials and Methods
3.3.1. Study area description
The study area is the S-191 sub-basin located in Taylor Creek / Nubbin Slough Lake
Okeechobee sub-watershed in southern Florida, directly north of Lake Okeechobee (Fig.
3-1a). The sub-basin covers 48,470 hectares of a flat landscape with generally poorly
drained soils characterized by a low phosphorus retention capacity (Zhao et al., 2012).
This investigated area consists of a collection of tributary streams flowing into Lake
Okeechobee through the S-191 flow control structure (Fig. 3-1b). The main tributaries
are Taylor Creek, Nubbin Slough, Henry Creek, Lettuce Creek, Mosquito Creek, and
Myrtle Slough (Fig. 3-1b). The annual average rainfall in the investigated sub-basin is
1,168 mm (Zhao et al., 2012), and the land use classification is composed of agriculture
accounting for approximately 74%, followed by forested areas (11%) and wetlands (9%).
Runoffs from farms have been identified as the major source of the TP water quality
problem in the S-191 sub-basin (Gale et al., 1993). Even though this sub-basin covers
only about 3.5% of the drainage area in Lake Okeechobee watershed, it annually
contributed about 34 mtons of TP to the Lake (during the last five years) (SFWMD,
2010), representing 32% of the TMDL. In addition, 99% of this sub-basin’s waterbodies
have been verified as impaired (USEPA, 2008). Therefore, local authorities have listed
this sub-basin as a top priority basin for TP reductions.
The present study used a modeling framework, illustrated in greater detail in
Supplemental Fig. 3-S1, integrating a basin-wide hydrology / water quality model and an
economic model to assess the cost-benefit of implementing a phosphorus credit trading
program in the S-191 sub-basin. The hydrology and water quality model captured the
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effects of rainfall, land use management practices, and soil characteristics on water flows
and phosphorus loads generated and transported within the basin and reaching the Lake.
The results of the hydrology and water quality model were then used as input data for the
economic model to identify the nutrient management practices, achieving a targeted load
reduction at the lowest total cost.
3.3.2. Hydrology and water quality modeling
Description of the model
The Watershed Assessment Model (WAM) developed by Soil Water Engineering
Technology (SWET), Inc. was used in this study to perform hydrology and water quality
analysis in the S-191 sub-basin. WAM is a Geographic Information System (GIS) based
model that simulates surface and ground water flow and nutrient constituents on a daily
basis based on the detailed physical properties of the watershed, underlying
hydrogeological system, and land use management practices (SWET, 2011a). WAM has
been already calibrated and validated for the northern Lake Okeechobee watershed to
characterize the hydrology and water quality of the watershed (HDR, 2004). WAM was
also specifically calibrated (calibration period 2002-2004) and validated (validation
period 2005-2009) for the S-191 sub-basin, where different Goodness-of-Fit (GOF)
statistic measures indicated that the WAM model results closely fitted the observed
hydrology and constituent loading data. During the calibration period, the Root Mean
Square Error (RMSE), Mean Bias Error (MBE), and the Nash-Sutcliffe coefficient of
efficiency (NS) obtained for monthly flows at the S-191 structure were 2.96 m3 s-1, 0.17
m3 s-1, and 0.90, respectively. During the validation period, the RMSE, MBE, and NS
obtained for monthly flows at the same structure were 2.45 m3 s-1, 0.25 m3 s-1, and 0.84,
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respectively. The RMSE, MBE, and NS obtained for monthly TP loadings at the S-191
structure during the calibration period were 7,383 kg, 174 kg, and 0.88, respectively and
during the validation period, those values were 5,345 kg, 1,545 kg, and 0.77, respectively
(SWET, 2011b).
The WAM model has been used in different studies to assess the nutrient
assimilation, and to conduct nutrient and water budgets throughout the Lake Okeechobee
watershed (Chebud et al., 2011; SFWMD et al., 2011; SWET, 2011a; SWET and JGH
Engineering, 2007; USEPA, 2008). The WAM model provides a spatial representation of
nutrient sources and transport processes (McCormick et al., 2011), and allows for the
assessment of the effectiveness of current and future management practices in the
watershed.
Input / output data
Input GIS data required for the WAM model set-up are land use, soil, rainfall
stations, topography, reach network, and basin drainage areas. Optional information
includes wastewater utility zone, point source locations, water control structures, and
springshed areas. Time series dataset consist of rainfall, flow, stage, and water quality
data (SWET, 2011a). In this study, the 2006 land use classification was obtained from the
South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD) using the Florida Land Use, Cover,
and Forms Classification System (FLUCCS) to define the land use types (SFWMD,
2013). Soil, topography, and hydrography data were obtained from the US Department of
Agriculture, Natural Resource Conservation Service database (USDA, 2013). Rainfall
data was collected from the SFWMD’s DBHYDRO database from four rainfall
monitoring sites (Fig. 3-1b) for the model simulation period (1999 to 2009), including a
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three-year model spin-up period (from 1999 to 2001) that allows for the variables to
stabilize. The output results were obtained from 2002 through 2009.
The model interface provides different formats for reviewing the output data such as
1) tables to compare annual average loads for different land uses under different
management scenarios, 2) graphs to assess flow and constituent time series in each reach
or to compare model output with monitored data, and 3) maps to understand the spatial
distribution of the annual averages flows and loads generated in each source cell within
the basin. The constituent loads and concentrations can be examined based on their unattenuated (amounts generated at the farm levels) or attenuated values (amounts reaching
the nearby stream) after the overland attenuation had been accounted for.
In-stream phosphorus attenuation analysis
WAM uses an algorithm that routes and attenuates the farm level nutrient loads to the
nearest stream based on distance, flow rate, and land use conditions between the source
and the nearby stream. An additional algorithm was developed here. A first order decay
equation, Equation (3-1), adopted from SWET (2011a), was used to attenuate TP load
from the nearby stream to the sub-basin outlet. As the two main forms of phosphorus,
dissolved (soluble – SP) and attached to the sediments (particulate – PP), are transported
through the stream network, they could be partially attenuated through diverse biophysico-chemical assimilation processes. The main factors driving these processes are the
stream velocity and rate of nutrient exchange between the water column and sediments. A
similar methodology was used by Chebud et al. (2010), Reddy et al. (1999), and Zhang et
al. (2002) to assess phosphorus attenuation in Lake Okeechobee watershed.
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C f = C b + (C o − C b ) ∗ e 

(3-1)

where C f is the TP concentration at the outlet of the sub-basin (mg L-1), C o is the TP
concentration at the outlet of each reach segment (mg L-1), C b is the TP background
concentration in the stream (mg L-1), v is the stream velocity (m s-1), and a is the rate of
load transfer (m s-1) referring to the rate at which TP is removed from the water column
and retained in the stream sediments (Reddy et al., 1999). Values of C b and a were
obtained from the WAM documentation (SWET, 2011a) and were calibrated for the
watershed. For the Soluble Phosphorus (SP), C b and a values were 0.02 mg L-1 and
0.00015 m s-1, respectively. For the Particulate Phosphorus (PP), C b and a values were
0.02 mg L-1and 0.0015 m s-1, respectively.
The S-191 sub-basin was then divided into zones with similar attenuation values,
which are ratios calculated from the TP load attenuated to the sub-basin outlet and the TP
load attenuated to the nearby stream. The attenuation values were then used to determine
the trading ratios required to balance the TP loads from trading sources located at a
different distance from the sub-basin outlet. This delivery type of ratio is commonly set
to account for pollutant attenuation throughout a watershed before reaching the impaired
waterbody. The trading ratio determined here is based on the stream velocity and load
transfer (the slower the rate the pollutant has to travel, the greater the attenuation will be).
3.3.3. Economic modeling
Description of the Least-Cost Abatement model
Several studies used empirical models to determine Least-Cost Abatement
approaches to comply with water quality standards and nutrient reduction goals (Kieser &
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Associates, 2004; Paniccia, 2002; Schleich and White, 1997; Schwartz, 2010). In the
present study, a conceptual model was developed to determine the optimal combination
of BMPs in order to reach an emission reduction goal at the minimum cost, assess the
optimal credit price, and quantify the cost-savings achieved while implementing a credit
trading program in the S-191 sub-basin. The conceptual Linear Programming (LP)
model, Equations (3-2) – (3-4), was formulated using the General Algebraic Modeling
System (GAMS) software. The objective function Min Z, represented in Equation (3-2),
was set to minimize the cost of implementing BMPs and new treatment technologies for
point and non-point sources, respectively. This would be the objective of a planner with
regard to the proposed TP trading program: minimization of the basin-wide total costs of
abating TP loading.
Min Z = ∑∑∑ ci ,k , j × X i ,k , j
i

k

(3-2)

j

Subject to:

∑∑∑ L

i, j

i

k

∑X

× rk , j × X i ,k , j ≥ Target _ Pred

(3-3)

j

i, k , j

≤ 1 ∀i, k , j

(3-4)

k

where the sub-indices i, j, and k represent the number of zones, the type of land use, and
the BMP or technology type, respectively. c i,k,j is the annual cost ($ yr-1) of implementing
a BMP or a new technology type (k) at a land use (j) in zone (i). X i,k,j is a binary variable
with a value of 1 if a BMP or a new technology type (k) is implemented, 0 otherwise. r k,j
is the TP load reduction (%) attained when implementing a BMP or a new technology
type (k) at land use (j). L i,j is the current TP load (kg yr-1) in the runoff from land use (j)
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located in zone (i), and Target_P red is the TP load reduction (kg yr-1) in the runoff at the
zone level when following the Command-and-Control approach. Supplemental Tables 3S1, 3-S2 and 3-S3 list the available three types of BMPs per land use (owner, typical, and
alternative), the corresponding costs, and TP removal efficiencies, respectively.
The first constraint, Equation (3-3), reflects that the sum of TP load reductions from
all sources or land uses (j) in each zone (i), after implementing a BMP or a new
technology type (k), needs to meet an established TP load reduction target (Target_P red )
at the zone level. The second constraint, Equation (3-4), is using a binary variable (0 or 1)
to indicate if a BMP or a new technology is implemented or not. For instance, a value of
1 is used when a BMP type (k) was adopted by land use (j) in zone (i), and 0 otherwise.
The developed model code contained one decision making variable, two constraints,
and allowed for the direct reading of the: 1) minimum cost of implementing several
management practices to reduce TP loads within the sub-basin in order to achieve a predetermined goal or reduction target, 2) optimal mix of BMP and technology types per
point and non-point sources to be implemented in order to cost-effectively reduce TP
loads in the sub-basin, 3) TP amount reduced, and 4) total cost of BMP or technology
implementation for each land use.
Input / output data
The four input data required to run the economic model were: 1) current TP loads per
area in the runoff from the different land use types obtained from the output results of the
hydrology and water quality WAM modeling, 2) surface area of the land use types per
zone estimated using ArcGIS tools (presented in Supplemental Table 3-S4), 3) annual
cost of implementing the three BMP types (i.e., owner, typical, and alternative) per land
69

use obtained from SWET (2006), and 4) TP load reduction efficiency per BMP type and
per land use also obtained from SWET (2006). Similar data were needed for point
sources regarding the implemented technologies. However, since the point sources in the
investigated sub-basin were dairies, the implemented technologies were also considered
as BMP types. Note that the annual costs included the operational and maintenance costs
and were indexed to 2012 dollars using the Consumer Price Index inflation calculation.
3.3.4. Phosphorus trading analysis
In order to determine the potential cost savings of implementing a TP trading
program in the sub-basin, two abatement scenarios were assumed: (a) a Command-andControl program, which is usually a non-market, regulatory program, and (b) a LeastCost Abatement scenario. Under the first scenario, the desired reduction target or cap was
set, and then the target was allocated across all sources using a pre-defined rule. The
second scenario is the market outcome expected to occur if landowners were to engage in
trading once the allocation is determined. The Least-Cost Abatement model presented in
Equations (3-2) – (3-4) was used to determine the least-cost management strategy and the
corresponding reduction levels of each source. The entire TP trading in the S-191 subbasin was assessed using six steps illustrated in Supplemental Fig. 3-S1b and explained in
the Supplemental Information section.
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3.4. Results and Discussion
3.4.1. Hydrology and water quality modeling
Runoff and percolation
The annual average values of water runoff and percolation within the S-191 sub-basin
were 20.0 and 6.4 cm yr-1, respectively, for a simulation period from years 2002 – 2009.
The average runoff value presented here was comparable to average values of 27.4 cm yr1

(time period 1991 – 2005) and 30.2 cm yr-1 (period 1991 – 1999) as reported by Zhang

et al. (2002) and Zhao et al. (2012), respectively, for different sites within the Lake
Okeechobee watershed. The highest runoff values were also characterized by the lowest
percolation rates due to the specific soil characteristics. Indeed, sandy spodosols, the
predominant type of soil in the basin, is a poorly drained soil (Bottcher et al., 1995) that
features surface water runoff as the primary flow pathway for TP transport to streams
(Campbell et al., 1995). WAM simulation results indicated that the average flow leaving
the sub-basin was around 3.68 m3 s-1 for the simulation period from 2002 – 2009. A
similar discharge value obtained from the SFWMD’s DBHYDRO database of 3.46 m3 s-1
was calculated at the S-191 structure for the same time period (SFWMD, 2013).
Phosphorus loads by land use
The TP loadings obtained from the WAM model for the major land use types within
the S-191 sub-basin are summarized in Table 3-1. The TP loads generated at the farm
level, at the nearby streams, and at the outlet of this sub-basin from all sources within the
sub-basin were estimated at 106.4, 91, and 85 mtons P yr-1, respectively. The TP loading
leaving the sub-basin obtained with the WAM model is comparable to the monitored data
at the S-191 structure of 72.8 mtons P yr-1 for the same simulation time period. It is worth
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mentioning that although the S-191 sub-basin area represents only 3.5% (48,470 ha) of
the Lake Okeechobee watershed drainage area, it contributed 81% (85 mtons P yr-1) of
the Lake TMDL (Zhang and Sharfstein, 2013). Moreover, the TP loads exceeded about
five times the tributary TMDL set for this sub-basin at 19 mtons P yr-1 (USEPA, 2008)
during this 7-year period.
From the TP loading of 91 mtons P yr-1 (attenuated to the nearby stream), 95% were
attributed to agriculture sources and 1.2% to urban areas, accounting for a combined TP
load of 87.9 mtons P yr-1 from non-point and point sources (Table 3-1). The remaining
3.4% of the TP load was attributed to natural areas. TP levels in surface water runoff are
associated with the land use and land management practices within the sub-basin
(Hiscock et al., 2003). Improved pastures represented the major land use type (56.5%)
and the major source of TP loadings with 56.2% (51.2 mtons P yr-1) generated within the
sub-basin. Dairy farms also represented a disproportionately large source of TP loadings,
contributing 22.6% (20.5 mtons P yr-1) of the total TP loadings, although they represented
only 4.6% of the total area. Other studies have also identified dairies as the primary TP
source within the northern Lake Okeechobee watershed (Bottcher et al., 1995).
TP fluxes at the farm level are also reported in Table 3-1 for several land uses. Dairy,
ornamental, and sod land use types presented the highest TP loading per hectare with
10.5, 9.0, and 6.5 kg ha-1 yr-1, respectively. The same range of values was found in other
studies reporting TP in runoff of 3.4, 2.4, and 6.6 kg ha-1 yr-1, respectively, for the same
land uses (SFWMD, 2010). In addition, Campbell et al. (1995) and Rechcigl and
Bottcher (1995) reported average TP losses in surface water runoff of 1.6 kg ha-1 yr-1 and
of 0.7 kg ha-1 yr-1, respectively from improved and unimproved pastures located in Lake
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Okeechobee watershed. These TP flux values were similar to the values estimated here
with WAM and presented in Table 3-1. They are 2.2 and 0.7 kg ha-1 yr-1 for improved
and unimproved pastures, respectively. Other studies conducted on different watersheds
also reported comparable average TP loads in runoff. For instance, Zhang et al. (2012)
estimated TP loads from improved pastures, row crop, and urban sources for watersheds
in the state of Michigan at 0.95, 0.6, and 0.3 kg ha-1 yr-1, respectively. However, it is
worth noticing that TP loads are greatly influenced by the hydrology, geology, and land
and soil site conditions, affecting local loading contributions by land use from watersheds
located in different geographic regions (Scott et al., 2011). Thus, it is important to
emphasize that the values reported above corresponded to TP loads from different
watersheds (Zhang et al., 2012) or from a different time period (Campbell et al., 1995;
Rechcigl and Bottcher, 1995; SFWMD, 2010).
Phosphorus attenuation
The TP loads un-attenuated (at the farm level) and attenuated (reaching the nearby
stream network once overland attenuation has been accounted for) are illustrated in Figs.
3-2a and 3-2b, respectively. Annual TP loading rates at the farm level averaged 2.2 kg
ha-1 yr-1 (Table 3-1), whereas attenuated TP loading rates to the nearby stream averaged
1.9 kg ha-1 yr-1. The major attenuation was observed in areas where features such as
wetlands were present along the flow pathway. The actual TP loading, from each stream
catchment area, reaching the sub-basin outlet was obtained using the in-stream
attenuation algorithm developed in the present study. Fig. 3-2c illustrates the TP loading
contribution from each source cell to the sub-basin outlet after stream attenuation factors
have been accounted for. The annual TP loading rate to the sub-basin outlet averaged 1.7
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kg ha-1 yr-1, which is comparable to the average unit TP load to the Lake reported by
Zhang et al. (2002) of 2.0 kg ha-1 yr-1 (from 1991 – 1999). When comparing the TP
loading spatial distribution at the farm level (Fig. 3-2a) to the one attenuated to the outlet
(Fig. 3-2c), the major changes occurred at the zones most distant from the sub-basin
outlet (north and west of the sub-basin). Moreover, when comparing the two figures, it is
worth noticing that the areas with high TP loadings (or hotspots) remain unchanged.
Fig. 3-3 represents the average attenuation factors classified by zones with different
assimilation conditions. The calculated attenuation factors represented the percent of
load assimilated by physical, chemical, and biological factors through the stream
network, thus reducing the load reaching the Lake (Reddy et al., 1999). These factors
depended mainly on the stream velocity, rate of nutrient exchange between the water
column and sediments, and the distance to the sub-basin outlet. Results indicated that
areas closer to the outlet yielded an attenuation factor of 1%, whereas areas further away
yielded an attenuation factor of 13%. This means that 13% of the TP loadings from a
source located in zone 6 (Fig. 3-3) will be assimilated or retained in the sub-basin through
natural processes, and the remaining load will reach the outlet to Lake Okeechobee
(assuming no phosphorus assimilation from the sub-basin outlet to the Lake). Previous
studies have estimated higher percentage of TP attenuated through the transport system.
For instance, Zhang et al. (2002) reported that 53.2% of TP was assimilated in the Lake
Okeechobee watershed; additionally, SFWMD (2010) estimated a 33.2% TP assimilation
for Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough sub-watershed. However, these percentages represented
larger areas and considered overland and stream attenuation rates. The SWET (2008)
report indicated TP assimilation rates for Lake Okeechobee watershed of 20 to 50% for
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upland overland flow and small streams, whereas lower assimilation rates of 2 to 20%
were reported for canals and stream conveyances systems, agreeing with the attenuation
factors represented here.
The calculated attenuation factors were then used to estimate the delivery trading
ratios (TRs) following Supplemental Equation (3-S3). TRs lower than one (Supplemental
Table 3-S5) are applied when a seller source is located downstream of the buyer source.
For example, a source, located in zone 3, buying credits from a seller located in zone 2
would have to apply a TR of 0.98, as indicated in Supplemental Table 3-S5. In contrast,
TRs greater than one were obtained when the seller source was located upstream of the
buyer’s location. Other trading programs also developed geographically-based trading
ratios to equalize the loading discharged from sources at different locations from the
basin outlet.

For instance, delivery trading ratios for the Long Island Sound Total

Nitrogen Credit Exchange program (CT, USA) ranged from 0.14 – 1 based on the
location (CTDEP, 2010).
The TP loads attenuated to the nearby stream from each land use were aggregated per
zone (listed in Supplemental Table 3-S6) and were then used as input data for the
economic modeling methodology, as illustrated in Supplemental Fig. 3-S1.
3.4.2. Economic modeling
Cap and allocations
In water quality trading programs, the cap is generally defined based on a watershed
mandatory goal for a particular pollutant, commonly known as the TMDL. For instance,
the goal of the Pennsylvania Water Quality Trading Program was based on phosphorus,
nitrogen, and sediment TMDLs previously established for the Chesapeake Bay (Branosky
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et al., 2011). In other trading programs, such as in the case of Neuse River Basin, a preset
percent load reduction was used to define the goal of the program (Hamstead and
BenDor, 2010). In the present study, the cap of the TP credit trading program for the S191 sub-basin could be calculated based on: 1) Lake Okeechobee TMDL of 105 mtons
yr-1, and 2) Lake Okeechobee tributary TMDL. At the S-191 sub-basin level those
numbers could be translated to 4.6 mtons P yr-1 (flow proportionality) and 19 mtons P yr1

, which are necessary caps to meet Lake Okeechobee and the tributary TMDLs,

respectively. Since WAM results indicated that 85 mtons yr-1 of TP were discharged from
this sub-basin (from 2002 – 2009), this means that a respective 95% and 78% TP load
reductions would be required to achieve the two possible caps presented above. The full
implementation of advanced alternative BMPs across the sub-basin would not achieve the
TP reduction needed for those two caps. Therefore, source control strategies cannot rely
exclusively on BMPs to reduce TP loads in order to achieve the Lake Okeechobee TMDL
or its tributary TMDL. An integrated approach encompassing different TP reduction
projects, such as water quality treatment, water storage, wetland restoration, and nutrient
trading among others, should be implemented in the sub-basin.
The costs resulting from implementing a Command-and-Control or a Least-Cost
Abatement scenario to achieve different TP loading caps (set at the nearby stream levels),
and the corresponding cost savings are illustrated in Fig. 3-4a. Cost savings ranged from
1% to 63%, representing two extreme cases. The highest cost savings corresponded to a
TP load of 2.3 kg ha-1 yr-1. The lowest cost savings were obtained when setting a TP load
target at 30.8 mtons yr-1, leading to the implementation of advanced BMPs on all land use
parcel sites. A TP load target of 1.6 kg ha-1 yr-1 (corresponding to a 30% load reduction at
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the zone level or at the nearby stream) reflected the most cost-effective situation,
achieving high cost savings (inflection point of the curves) of 31% ($1.5 million per year)
when comparing the Least-Cost Abatement scenario to a Command-and-Control
approach (Fig. 3-4a). This TP reduction target of 30% at the zone level represented a cap
of 61.5 mtons P yr-1 for the S-191 trading program. Since the economic modeling used
the TP loads from the potential trading sources (agricultural and urban land uses), a total
of 87.9 mtons P yr-1 was assumed as the TP load before BMP implementation at the
nearby stream level. The zone level cap of 61.5 mtons P yr-1 was equivalent to 57.1
mtons P yr-1 at the sub-basin outlet after phosphorus attenuation was considered for the
entire basin. A higher percentage of TP reduction could be set as the cap of this trading
program; however, as illustrated in Fig. 3-4a, this implies higher pollution abatement
costs, and therefore lower cost savings, when comparing the Least-Cost Abatement
scenario to a Command-and-Control approach.
The individual allocation was determined by uniformly distributing the cap among
the potential trading sources. The resulted uniform allocation was set at 1.6 kg ha-1 yr-1,
corresponding to the maximum TP load rate allowed to be discharged at each zone from
the different land use types. Other methods exist for setting the allocation; however,
almost every method presents some inequities. For example, the cap can be distributed
equally among all existing sources or proportionally to the current loadings. The problem
with the former method is that it does not consider that sources within the sub-basin
greatly differ in size and their discharged load. Allocations based on load reduction by a
fixed percentage might be perceived equitable. However, it does not recognize previous
efforts and investments to implement technologies in order to reduce emissions (Field
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and Field, 2006). The approach selected in the present study to define allocation loads
ensured a measurable cap and was proportional to the source size.
The Command-and-Control and the Least-Cost Abatement Scenarios
•

BMP optimization

Under the Command-and-Control approach, the best available technology or BMP for
each land use type and zone was selected in order to meet individual TP load allocations
(Supplemental Fig. 3-S2a). Some land use types, such as citrus, unimproved pastures,
rangelands and wooded pastures, and urban areas did not require application of any
BMPs, because they were already in compliance with their individual allocation loads. In
contrast, dairies, field crops, ornamentals, and soy land use types needed respectively up
to 88%, 70%, 86%, and 73% of TP reduction to reach their individual load allocations.
Therefore, the most advanced and expensive type of BMP – type III – (a combination of
owner, typical, and alternative BMPs) had to be implemented for these land uses. On the
other hand, under the Least-Cost Abatement approach, the selection of the BMP types
was optimized in order to achieve the lowest cost while reaching the overall TP reduction
target for the S-191 sub-basin (Supplemental Fig. 3-S2b). In this case, BMP type I
(owner type) was selected to be implemented on citrus and urban areas, reaching a TP
load reduction of 5% and 12%, respectively, at no cost (Supplemental Tables 3-S2 and 3S3). Moreover, a BMP type I was selected to be implemented on most of dairy farms,
instead of the BMP type III needed under the conventional approach, thus decreasing the
annual investment from $3.3 million to $0.4 million for this land use type within the subbasin.
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•

TP loads after BMP implementation

The total TP load from agricultural and urban sources reaching the nearby stream and
the sub-basin outlet following the implementation of BMPs was 52.2 and 48.5 mtons P
yr-1, respectively, under both scenarios. This is equivalent to a TP reduction of 41%
higher than the preset TP reduction target of 30%, because of the discrete nature of the
BMP data used in this study (Supplemental Table 3-S3). In other words, in some cases,
the required percentage load reduction was lower than the percentage efficiency of the
BMP needed to be applied – thus leading to an overall higher TP reduction.
Potential land use buyers were identified whenever TP loadings under the Least-Cost
Abatement were above the Command-and-Control TP loadings; otherwise the land uses
were identified as potential sellers (Supplemental Table 3-S7). The difference in the loads
under both scenarios reflected the number of credits available to sell or the number of
credits needed to buy (defined as the difference in TP load amount in kg). For example,
citrus, improved pastures, and urban land uses could potentially sell 144, 11,632, and 57
TP credits, respectively. Alternatively, dairies, ornamentals, row crops, and sod land uses
would need to purchase 11,000, 320, 85, and 418 TP credits, respectively. These results
suggest that 11,832 credits were available for sell and for purchase to offset TP loadings
in the entire sub-basin. Therefore, enough supply of TP credits existed in this sub-basin to
offset the demand of potential trading buyers.
•

Credit price

The credit price was obtained from the Least-Cost Abatement scenario while deriving
the marginal abatement costs for all trading sources to meet a specific TP load as
illustrated in Fig. 3-4b. This aggregate supply curve indicates the price that trading
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sources would be willing to pay to reduce the basin TP loads to different levels. In the
present case, in order to reach a TP loading of 52.2 mtons yr-1 from all trading sources,
the credit price was around $179. A similar methodology to calculate the marginal costs
was used by Paniccia (2002) resulting in credit prices up to $12,000, when developing a
trading program among metal wastewater treatment plants. Point to non-point nutrient
trading programs, located in different watersheds within the United States, such as in the
Lower St. Johns River (FL), Chesapeake Bay (PA), and Great Miami River (OH)
watersheds, reported credit prices of $151.8, $22, and $28.2, respectively, for TP credits
exchanged (Corrales et al., 2013). It is worth noticing that marginal abatement cost
curves represent the abatement cost for a single point in time and hence are subject to
inter-temporal dynamics. This means that marginal abatement costs depend on abatement
actions realized in earlier time periods and expectations about later time periods (Kesicki,
2011).
•

Credits exchanged and cost savings

Tables 3-2 and 3-3 represent the list of potential buyers and sellers that were
identified in this sub-basin, as well as their respective cost savings. In total, 10 buyers and
14 sellers were identified. The total number of TP credits exchanged was 9,579,
corresponding to 81% of the credits available for trading. Dairy farms were the major
buyer source, purchasing in total 8,879 credits, whereas improved pastures were the most
important seller source, selling in total 9,378 credits. As illustrated in Table 3-2, the costs
of BMP implementation under the Command-and-Control approach for all buyers was
1.5 times higher than the costs obtained under a trading scenario approach, representing
an annual cost savings of $966,443. Although sellers incurred an additional cost of $1.4
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million by switching from the Command-and-Control scenario to the Least-Cost
Abatement scenario, they also sold $1.7 million worth of credits, representing an annual
cost savings of $376,022. A transaction fee of 10% was added to the credit cost for buyer
sources, in order to consider the cost associated with research, negotiation, approval,
monitoring, and finding trading partners (Stavins, 2003). Transaction cost estimates for
market-based or conservation programs ranged between 10% and 50%. Galik et al.
(2012) assessed transactions cost for the U.S forest carbon offset program as 25% per
credit sold. Heimlich (2005) estimated transaction cost factors of 10% to 15% for
Conservation Reserve Programs (CRP). Fang et al. (2005) estimated a 35% transaction
cost for the Minnesota River Basin nutrient trading program.

Knowing that high

transaction costs could jeopardize the trading activity (Corrales et al., 2013), a low 10%
was adopted as the transaction cost in order to retain the cost effectiveness while still
meeting environmental benefits.
Overall, the total cost savings of a credit trading program, obtained under the current
scenario to reduce TP loadings in the S-191 sub-basin, were 27% ($1.3 million per year)
in comparison to a conventional Command-and-Control approach. Other studies have
estimated cost savings about 36% and 74% for trades between point and non-point
sources over traditional Command-and-Control approaches, respectively for the
Chesapeake Bay (Van Houtven et al., 2012) and the Great Miami River watershed
(Kieser & Associates, 2004). However, it is important to emphasize that cost savings vary
substantially depending on different factors, such as 1) the type of trading allowed in the
program (i.e., only between point sources, between point and non-point sources, or
between non-point sources), 2) the geographic region – the larger the area where trading
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is allowed, the wider range of trading opportunities, and therefore the larger cost savings
– (Van Houtven et al., 2012), and 3) the technology and management practices available
for nutrient reduction for diverse sources in the watershed.
3.5. Conclusions
The economic and environmental benefits of implementing a phosphorus credit
trading program were assessed for the S-191 sub-basin located in the Lake Okeechobee
watershed. A water quality model was linked to an economic model to assess the
feasibility of a phosphorus credit trading program in this agricultural sub-basin. The
hydrology and water quality model was used to quantify the effects of rainfall, land use
type, soil characteristics, and management practices on the phosphorus loadings
generated at the farm level, attenuated to the nearby stream, and attenuated to the subbasin outlet. The most cost effective cap of 30% TP reduction (equivalent to a total
loading of 61.5 mtons P yr-1 at the zone level) was set and two abatement approaches
(Least-Cost Abatement and Command-and-Control) were compared in this study.
The Least-Cost Abatement approach provided the optimal combination of
management practices that minimized the cost to achieve the cap in the S-191 sub-basin.
When comparing the two approaches, the estimated potential cost savings were of 27%
($1.3 million per year), based on an optimal credit price of $179. In this study, dairies
(major buyer), ornamentals, and sod land use types were identified as potential credit
buyers, whereas citrus, improved pastures (major seller), and urban land uses were
identified as potential credit sellers. The results of the trading scenario also suggested an
adequate supply of TP credits to meet the buyers demand. Almost 81% of the TP credits
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available for trading (corresponding to 9,579 TP credits) were exchanged. It is worth
emphasizing that the cost savings achieved are greatly influenced by site-specific factors
such as the type of pollution sources, the geographical location, BMPs nutrient removal
efficiencies and cost data, etc. Expanding the geographic scope of trading to the entire
Taylor Creek / Nubbin Slough sub-watershed or to the whole Lake Okeechobee
watershed, would lead to a different trading scenario with different delivery trading
ratios, and potentially higher cost savings. However, the methodology presented here can
be used and easily modified to incorporate other forms of trading (e.g., point-to-point
trading), other contaminants, or other technologies and management practices.
Implementation of a phosphorus trading program in the S-191 sub-basin should be
considered as part of an integrated approach to reduce phosphorus loadings in the Lake
Okeechobee watershed.
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3.8. Tables
Table 3-1. Average annual Total Phosphorus (TP) load per land use type.

Land Use

Area (ha)

Citrus
Improved Pastures
Unimproved Pastures
Rangeland and Wooded Pastures
Dairies
Field Crop
Ornamentals
Row Crop
Sod
Urban
Natural Areasa
Total

1,415 (2.9%)
27,372 (56.5%)
1,571 (3.2%)
201 (0.4%)
2,210 (4.6%)
1,745 (3.6%)
222 (0.5%)
214 (0.4%)
373 (0.8%)
2,423 (5%)
10,724 (22.1%)
48,470 (100%)

a

TP load at
the farm
level
(mtons yr-1)
1.2
59.2
1.1
0.2
23.3
10.3
2
0.5
2.4
2.1
4.0
106.4

TP load
attenuated to
the nearby
stream
(mtons yr-1)
1.2 (1.3%)
51.2 (56.2%)
1 (1.1%)
0.1 (0.2%)
20.5 (22.6%)
8.5 (9.3)
1.7 (1.9%)
0.5 (0.5%)
2 (2.2%)
1.1 (1.2%)
3.1 (3.4%)
91 (100%)

TP loadings from natural areas were not considered in the credit trading program assessment.
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TP load
attenuated
to the subbasin outlet
(mtons yr-1)

TP load flux at
the farm level
(kg ha-1 yr-1)

1.1
47.5
1
0.1
19.5
8
1.6
0.4
1.9
1.1
2.9
85

0.9
2.2
0.7
0.8
10.5
5.9
9.0
2.4
6.5
0.9
0.4
2.2

Table 3-2. Summary of credits bought and costs for the buyer sources.
ID
B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
B8
B9
B10

Buyer/
Zonea
D/ 1
O/ 1
D/ 2
O/ 2
S/ 2
D/ 3
O/ 3
O/ 4
D/ 5
S/ 6

Seller IDb
S8, S9, S10, S11
S3, S4, S5
S11, S12, S13, S14
S5
S5
S5, S6, S7, S8
S5
S5
S9
S1, S2

c'
($)c

c''
($)d

766,780
12,904
1,099,001
12,289
117,545
321,840
58,990
46,700
498,333
2,466
2,936,847

a

2,997
4,322
4,296
4,116
30,007
1,258
19,756
15,640
1,948
84,339

Credits
Bought
2,883
42
2,503
32
413
1,384
82
118
2,109
12
9,579

(D), Dairies; (O), Ornamentals; (S) Sod.
Identification of the sellers (from Table 3-3) selling credits to the specific buyer.
c
Annual cost under the Command-and-Control approach.
d
Annual cost under the Least-Cost Abatement approach.
e
Cost of the credits bought plus a 10% transaction fee.
f
Annual cost savings calculated following Supplemental Equation (3-S6).
b
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c'''
($)e
567,679
8,194
492,907
6,398
81,349
272,432
16,131
23,285
415,266
2,422
1,886,065

Cost savings
($)f
196,104
388
601,799
1,776
6,188
48,150
23,102
7,775
81,119
44
966,443

Table 3-3. Summary of credits sold and costs for the seller sources.

ID

Seller/
Zonea

S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
S7
S8
S9
S10
S11
S12
S13
S14

U/ 1
C/ 2
U/ 2
C/ 3
IP/ 3
U/ 3
C/ 4
IP/ 4
U/ 4
C/ 5
IP/ 5
U/ 5
C/ 6
U/ 6

Buyer IDb
B10
B10
B2
B2
B2, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8
B6
B6
B1, B6
B1, B9
B1
B1, B3
B3
B3
B3

c'
($)c

c''
($)d

58,978
257,152
50,990
367,119

a

235,912
819,671
650,119
1,705,702

Credits
Sold
6
6
18
5
1,585
25
48
3,714
4
38
4,079
1
47
2
9,579

(U), Urban; (C), Citrus; (IP), Improved Pastures.
Identification of the buyer (from Table 3-2) purchasing credits from the specific seller.
c
Annual cost under the Command-and-Control approach.
d
Annual cost under the Least-Cost Abatement approach.
e
Cost of the credits sold.
f
Annual cost savings calculated following Supplemental Equation (3-S5).
b
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c'''
($)e
1,062
1,126
3,299
812
283,735
4,519
8,654
664,813
774
6,759
730,167
150
8,371
363
1,714,605

Cost savings
($)f
1,062
1,126
3,299
812
106,801
4,519
8,654
102,294
774
6,759
131,037
150
8,371
363
376,022

3.9. Figures

Figure 3-1. (a) Maps of Florida, Lake Okeechobee watershed, and S-191 sub-basin study
area. (b) S-191 sub-basin hydrography and rainfall stations.
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Figure 3-2. Total Phosphorus (TP) loading spatial distribution (kg ha-1 yr-1): (a) unattenuated at the farm level, (b) attenuated to the nearby stream, (c) attenuated to the subbasin outlet. (d) Land use classification in the S-191 sub-basin.
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Figure 3-3. Zone classification of the phosphorus attenuation factors.
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Figure 3-4. (a) Costs and cost savings (in million dollars per year) of achieving different
TP loading caps at the zone level under a Command-and-Control approach and a LeastCost Abatement scenario. (b) Credit price ($) determination.
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3.10. Supplemental Information
It includes details about the Watershed Assessment Model, the equimarginal cost
principle, the marginal abatement cost, and the six steps for phosphorus trading analysis.
It also includes Figs. 3-S1, 3-S2 and 3-S3, as well as Tables 3-S1, 3-S2, 3-S3, 3-S4, 3-S5,
3-S6 and 3-S7 as indicated in the text.
3.10.1. Watershed assessment model (WAM)

WAM model uses a cell-grid based system that overlays land use, soil, rain zone, and
wastewater treatment zone input data to create a group of unique cells to be modeled
using the most appropriate field-scale sub-model. The Basin Unique Cell Shell program
(BUCSHELL) selects one of the three field-scale sub-models differing in their ability to
deal with the specific and distinctive natural characteristics of land use and soil type.
Well drained soils are generally simulated by the Groundwater Loading Effects of
Agricultural Management Systems (GLEAMS) (Knisel, 1993). High water table soils are
simulated using the Everglades Agricultural Area Model (EAAMOD) (SWET, 2008).
Land use/soil combinations not handled by either GLEAMS or EAAMOD, such as
wetlands, impervious urban areas, aquaculture, and mining operations are modeled using
a special case module created specifically for WAM (SWET, 2011a). Each field-scale
model calculates daily surface and groundwater flows and constituent concentrations
leaving each source cell in the watershed. The flows and loads are then routed to the
nearest stream within the Basin Land Area to Stream Routing sub-model
(BLASROUTE). Water and constituents reaching the streams are then routed hydrodynamically through the stream network to the outlet while being attenuated based on
features encountered along the way, such as wetlands or depressions, or based on the
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stream and structure types. WAM uses Thiessen polygons to create rainfall zones linked
to daily rainfall records. The rainfall data, the driving force of the model, will determine
how much runoff or groundwater percolation would originate at each source cell and then
be routed to the nearest stream.
3.10.2. Equimarginal cost principle and marginal abatement cost

Theoretically, when there are multiple sources of a particular pollutant with differing
marginal abatement cost, and if it is desired to achieve a given goal at the lowest possible
cost, then emissions from various sources must be in accordance with the “equimarginal
cost principle” (Field and Field, 2006). This economic principle, illustrated in Fig. 3-S3
depicting the Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curves of two hypothetical TP sources (A
and B) with different abatement costs, is related to the fact that pollution sources use
different management practices or technologies to control emissions. MAC curves act
essentially as supply curves, showing the amount of load reduction that sources would
achieve at different costs (Field and Field, 2006). The intersection of the two marginal
abatement costs (Fig. 3-S3) is where economic efficiency, also known as the
equimarginal cost principle, is met (Bockel et al., 2012). In other words, least-cost
solutions for achieving a desired abatement level (e*) are only reached when marginal
abatement cost of different pollution sources are equal (Field and Field, 2006). The MAC
value p* is associated with the efficient abatement level e*, and represents the credit
price (or shadow price) that potential buyers or sellers will be willing to pay or sell for
nutrient credits. For the source A, the total cost to attain the reduction level e* is denoted
by the area a, whereas for source B the total cost is denoted by the area b. The efficient
abatement level, e*, shows that a source with a low abatement cost (Source B) should
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reduce more emissions than the high abatement cost source (Source A). A source will be
willing to purchase credits if its marginal abatement cost is higher than the credit price, to
save the difference in abatement cost. In contrast, a source will be willing to sell credits if
its marginal abatement cost is lower than the credit price, because the revenue from the
sale would cover the added abatement cost incurred to reduce additional emissions. In
general, buyers in trading programs want to minimize the price of purchasing an offset
credit, and sellers want to minimize the cost of producing them (King and Kuch, 2003).
MAC curves have been used in different sectors to identify cost-efficient means to
meet with emission reduction targets (Kesicki, 2011). For instance, MAC curves have
been used to analyze air pollutant reduction (Rentz et al., 1994), waste reduction
(Beaumont and Tinch, 2004), water consumption reduction (Addams et al., 2009), and
mitigation potential of technical practices in the agriculture sector (Bockel et al., 2012) to
prioritize investment opportunities and shape policy discussions.
3.10.3. Phosphorus trading analysis

Step 1: Cap and allocations
In the present study, the cap was defined as the TP loading feasibly achieved at the
zone level by implementing the three available types of BMPs per land use (owner,
typical, and alternative) within the study area (Table 3-S1). This means that the sum of
the TP loads attenuated to the nearby stream from all land uses should be equal or less
than the cap. A proportionality factor, based on the zone attenuation factor obtained for
the entire S-191 sub-basin, was then applied to translate the cap set at the land users’
zone location to the S-191 sub-basin outlet. This was done to account for the fact that the
TP loads discharged at the nearby stream will be attenuated before reaching the basin
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outlet. The resulting area normalized allocation load (kg P ha-1 yr-1) was then set for
every TP loading source in the sub-basin.
Step 2: Cost under a Command-and-Control approach
Under this approach, the cost was calculated based on the BMPs available that can be
implemented to meet TP loading individual allocations (Table 3-S2). The corresponding
TP removal efficiencies for each land use per BMP type are presented in Table 3-S3. The
TP load (L’ i,j in mtons P yr-1), if BMPs were implemented, was calculated for each land
use and zone following Equation (3-S1).
L'i , j = (1 − rk , j ) × Li , j

(3-S1)

where r k,j is the TP load reduction percentage obtained at the land use j due to the
implementation of BMP (k), L i,j (mtons P yr-1) is the current average annual TP load
discharged from land use (j) located in zone (i) obtained from the output of the WAM
model for the simulation period of 2002 – 2009.
The TP load (L’ i,j ) after BMP implementation under a Command-and-Control
approach represents the baseline load. The difference between this baseline TP load and
the TP load obtained under a trading program determined the number of credits to
purchase or to sell in a market program (Corrales et al., 2013). The total sub-basin load
reduction target at the zone level (Target_P red ) for the S-191 sub-basin was calculated by
adding the TP load reductions across all TP sources within the area. The cost of BMP
implementation was also estimated for each zone and land use combination (i,j) using
Equation (3-S2).
c'i , j = c k , j × ai , j

(3-S2)
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where c k,j ($ ha-1 yr-1) is the annual cost per area and per implemented BMP (Table 3-S2)
and a i,j (ha) is the area of each land use per zone (Table 3-S4). The annual costs included
the amortized capital cost at 10% interest over a twenty-year life span and the annual
operation and maintenance (O&M) costs represented 20% per year of the capital cost
(SWET, 2006). The total cost of the Command-and-Control approach (tot_c’) was
estimated by adding the individual costs.
Step 3: Cost under the Least-Cost Abatement approach
The mathematical optimization model described in Equations (3-2) – (3-4) developed
in the paper, was solved to determine the optimal combination of BMPs to achieve the TP
load reduction target (Target_P red ) at the lowest cost. TP loads per land use and zone
(L’’ i,j ) and individual (c’’ i,j ) and total costs (tot_c’’) after optimal-BMPs have been
selected, were also calculated. The difference in total costs (tot_c’ - tot_c’’) between
Command-and-Control and Least-Cost Abatement approaches, identifies the maximum
potential cost savings of the TP credit trading program.
Step 4: Credit price and identification of sellers and buyers
Total Abatement Cost (TAC) curve was derived for the S-191 sub-basin by running
the optimization model and recording the cost of achieving different TP load targets. The
slope of the cost versus TP load curve reflected the credit price or the maximum price
that pollution sources are willing to pay for removing an additional unit of pollutant
(Field and Field, 2006). Theoretically, this slope also represents the equimarginal
abatement costs across all the sources at the respective loading target.

Land users

discharging above their baseline, obtained under the Command-and-Control approach
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(L’ i,j ), were identified as buyers of credits. On the other hand, land users discharging
below their baseline were identified as credit sellers.
Step 5: Credits traded and cost
The amount of credits needed (Credits needed ) for buyers to offset the difference in TP
load between the Command-and-Control and Least-Cost Abatement approaches was
subject to a trading ratio (TR) to account for differences in load attenuation from each
discharger relative to the basin outlet (Kardos and Obropta, 2011; Lal et al., 2009;
Ribaudo and Gottlieb, 2011). Attenuation factors, previously determined for different
zones, were used to calculate the buyer-to-seller TR following Equation (3-S3).
Therefore, the number of credits a buyer will purchase depended on the buyer and seller’s
zone location and were calculated following Equation (3-S4).
TR =

(1 − Buyer ' s attenuation factor )
(1 − Seller ' s attenuation factor )

(3-S3)

Number of Credits bought = TR × Number of Credits needed

(3-S4)

The cost of the credits (c’’’ i,j ) was based on the number of credits bought and the
credit price plus a transaction fee of 10% of the credit price (Stavins, 2003). It is worth
noticing that the transaction fee was only added to the costs when purchasing credits.
Step 6: Cost savings and a trading scenario
The net cost savings for each source trading credits was calculated following
Equations (3-S5) and (3-S6). The cost savings for a seller was calculated by subtracting
the additional cost incurred under the Least-Cost Abatement approach from the market
value of credits sold as shown in Equation (3-S5). The additional cost, represented by the
expression within the parenthesis, is resulting from the implementation of more capital100

intensive BMPs through the Least-Cost Abatement approach, i.e., the incremental costs
of shifting from a command and control scenario to a Least-Cost Abatement scenario. In
contrast, the cost savings for a buyer was calculated by subtracting the cost of buying
(including the cost obtained after optimization, cost of purchasing credits and transaction
costs) from the cost incurred under the Command-and-Control approach as expressed in
Equation (3-S6).
Savings sellers = c' ' 'i , j − (c' 'i , j − c'i , j )

(3-S5)

Savingsbuyers = c'i , j − (c' 'i , j + c' ' 'i , j + trans. fee)

(3-S6)

Considering that a buyer cost savings will be maximized if credits were bought from
a source downstream of its own location, buyers with less cost savings were first allowed
to purchase credits from sellers located in the closest zones to the basin outlet. The grand
total cost savings from a trading program relative to a Command-and-Control approach
adopted within the S-191 sub-basin was estimated by combining the individual cost
savings from all buyers and sellers sources.
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3.10.5. Tables

Table 3-S1. Best Management Practices (BMPs) description.
BMP
Type

Owner

Typical

Description
Phosphorus reduced to zero, better
nutrient management, grass
management, and feeder/minerals
and water placement
Improved grass management,
watering facilities, and feed
placement
Feed ration management
Reduce phosphorus fertilization
Stormwater R/D and wetland
restoration
Rotational grazing, new water
facilities, retention basin by working
pens, critical area fencing, and
moderate wetland
restoration/detention
Some rotational grazing, retention
basin by working pens, and
moderate wetland
restoration/detention
Water management, additional
stormwater retention, cover crop, and
limited wetlamd restoration/retention
Limited dry retention, street
sweeping, sediment R/D and wetland
restoration

C

IP

x

x

UP

RWP

D

FC

O

RC

S

U

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
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Table 3-S1. Continued.
BMP Type

Description

C

IP

UP

RWP

D

FC

O

RC

S

U

Fertigation, grassed waterways, and
edge-of-farm stormwater R/D with
x
chemical treatment
Provide alternative shade to move
cattle from streams, and edge-ofx
x
farm Stormwater R/D and chemical
treatment
Critical area fencing, and edge-offarm stormwater R/D and chemical
x
x
treatment
Solids separation for off site
disposal, add housing to move
animals off field, stormwater
Alternative
retention/expanded sprayfields, edgeof-field chemical treatment, buffer
x
strips, edge-of-farm stormwater R/D
and chemical treatment, water reuse
from R/D ponds, erosion control, and
edge-of-farm stormwater R/D and
chemical treatment
Edge-of-farm stormwater R/D and
x
chemical treatment
Water reuse from R/D ponds, erosion
control, and edge-of-farm
x
x
x
stormwater R/D and chemical
treatment
R/D: Retention and detention; C: Citrus; IP: Improved pastures; UP: Unimproved pastures; RWP: Rangeland and wooded pastures; D: Dairies;
FC: Field crops; O: Ornamentals; RC: Row crops; S: Sod; U: Urban.
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Table 3-S2. Annual cost of implementing the three BMP types per land use and per area ($ ha-1 yr-1) (from SWET, 2006).
BMP
Typea
I
II
III
a

Citrus
71.4
294.6

Improved
Pastures
11.6
46.4
147.8

Unimproved
Pastures
2.9
14.5
66.7

Rangeland
and
Wooded
Pasture
2.9
14.5
66.7

Dairies
5.8
973.0
1,483.1

Field
Crop
11.6
46.4
147.8

Ornamentals
11.6
205.8
614.5

Row
Crop
10.2
204.0
612.2

Sod
6.4
104.9
411.0

Urban
463.8
3,431.8

Type I: Owner type BMPs; Type II: Owner and typical BMPs; Type III: Owner, typical, and alternative BMPs.

Table 3-S3. Best Management Practices (BMPs) efficiency – TP load reduction in percentage (%) (from SWET, 2006).
BMP
Typea
I
II
III
a

Citrus

Improved
Pastures

12%
32%
61%

11%
30%
64%

Unimproved
Pastures
7%
20%
55%

Rangeland
and
Wooded
Pasture
4%
10%
42%

Dairies
9%
37%
67%

Field
Crop
15%
40%
62%

Ornamentals
32%
67%
84%

Type I: Owner type BMPs; Type II: Owner and typical BMPs; Type III: Owner, typical, and alternative BMPs.
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Row
Crop
30%
60%
80%

Sod
20%
47%
74%

Urban
5%
10%
73%

Table 3-S4. Land use distribution per zone in the S-191 sub-basin (ha).

Citrus
Improved Pastures
Unimproved Pastures
Rangeland and Wooded
Pastures
Dairies
Field Crop
Ornamentals
Row Crop
Sod
Urban

Zone 1
669
3

Zone 2
49
4,529
113

Zone 3
45
5,087
740

Zone 4
474
5,545
487

Zone 5
414
4,398
142

Zone 6
433
7,144
86

-

66

60

34

41

-

517
21
138

741
575
20
6
286
768

217
162
96
10
990

162
514
76
61
376

336
231
9
32
81
35

237
263
105
6
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Table 3-S5. Delivery trading ratios.
Buyer’s
location
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6

Zone 1
1.00
0.98
0.96
0.94
0.92
0.88

Zone 2
1.02
1.00
0.98
0.96
0.94
0.90

Seller’s location
Zone 3
Zone 4
1.04
1.06
1.02
1.04
1.00
1.02
0.98
1.00
0.96
0.98
0.92
0.94

Zone 5
1.09
1.07
1.04
1.02
1.00
0.96

Zone 6
1.14
1.11
1.09
1.07
1.05
1.00

Table 3-S6. Total phosphorus load attenuated to the nearby stream per land use and per
zone in the S-191 sub-basin (kg ha-1 yr-1).
Land Use
Citrus
Improved Pastures
Unimproved Pastures
Rangeland and Wooded
Pasture
Dairies
Field Crop
Ornamentals
Row Crop
Sod
Urban

Zone 1

Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
1.1
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.9
1.5
2.5
1.6
2.0
1.8
1.7
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.8
0.5
0.5
-

1.0

0.6

0.6

0.6

-

8.9
11.3
0.9

8.2
5.4
9.4
2.5
5.2
0.5

10.9
4.5
5.0
2.5
0.5

13.4
4.9
9.4
2.3
0.2

11.1
4.8
9.6
2.0
6.0
0.5

6.7
3.7
2.1
3.1
0.4
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Table 3-S7. Total phosphorus load attenuated to the nearby stream per land use after Best
Management Practice (BMP) implementation under a Command-and-Control approach
and a Least-Cost Abatement scenario.

Land Use

TP load under
Command-andControl
(kg yr-1)

Citrus
Improved Pastures
Unimproved Pastures
Rangeland and Wooded Pastures
Dairies
Field Crop
Ornamentals
Row Crop
Sod
Urban

1,197
37,565
1,040
148
6,780
3,223
273
311
522
1,136
52,196

TP load under
Least-Cost
Abatement
(kg yr-1)
1,054
25,934
1,040
148
17,780
3,223
592
396
940
1,079
52,188

Potential
buyer or
seller
Seller
Seller
Buyer
Buyer
Buyer
Buyer
Seller

Note: Total Phosphorus loads were expressed in kilograms (kg) to identify the buyer and seller sources and
the respective number of credits to be purchased or available to sell.
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3.10.6. Figures

Figure 3-S1. Diagram illustrating the methodology followed to: (a) estimate the total
phosphorus (TP) loadings before implementation of Best Management Practices (BMPs)
at each zone i and land use j as well as the trading ratios (TR) at each zone i, and (b)
assess the trading program cost savings.
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Figure 3-S2. (a) Best Management Practices (BMP) selected under a Command-andControl approach and (b) under a Least-Cost Abatement scenario. C stands for citrus, IP
for improved pastures, UP for unimproved pastures, RWP for rangeland and wooded
pastures, D for dairies, FC for field crops, O for ornamentals, RC for row crops, S for
sod, and U for urban
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Figure 3-S3. Credit price identification from the Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC)
curves.
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CHAPTER 4
WATER QUALITY TRADING OPPORTUNITIES IN TWO SUB-WATERSHEDS
IN THE NORTHERN LAKE OKEECHOBEE WATERSHED

4.1. Introduction
Affecting both freshwater and coastal ecosystems, nutrient eutrophication is a subtle
yet rapidly growing environmental problem of international significance. Phosphorus
plays a critical role in the impairment of fresh waterbodies. Addressing the high levels of
phosphorus reaching the ecosystems is a challenging task, which integrates a multifaceted
program with the participation of agencies, academic institutions, the private sector, and
other stakeholders. Phosphorus source control efforts, currently implemented to reduce
phosphorus in the runoff from watersheds, have not yet yielded the desired improvements
in water quality (Jarvie et al., 2013), particularly in complex and large watersheds, such
as the Lake Okeechobee watershed (LOW) in Florida, USA (Figure 4-1). Anthropogenic
factors, and hydrologic and land use modifications in the LOW have led to water quality
impairment of Lake Okeechobee (LO) (FDEP, 2014). The water quality impairment has
been mainly linked to excessive phosphorus loadings, originating from diverse sources,
including agriculture and livestock, municipal and industrial discharges, and urban
stormwater runoff (FDEP, 2001). Anthropogenic additions of phosphorus altered many
aspects of the structure and function of LO’s ecosystem (Havens and Gawlik, 2005). In
order to prevent further degradation of the lake and protect its designated uses (e.g.,
drinking, fishing, recreation, irrigation, etc.), the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection (FDEP) adopted a Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL), establishing an
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annual target load for total phosphorus (TP) of 140 metric tons (mtons) to be discharged
into LO from all sources in the watershed and from atmospheric deposition (Zhao et al.,
2012). The TMDL is intended to be achieved in a multi-phased approach by the
implementation of a series of projects and programs delineated in the LO Basin
Management Action Plan (BMAP). The first phase of this BMAP includes projects that
will achieve a TP reduction of approximately 145 mtons yr-1, with an estimated total cost
of more than $ 937.7 million (FDEP, 2014). Additional projects and resources would be
needed to achieve the TMDL and to further improve the water quality of the lake.
Consequently, it is imperative to establish economic incentive policies to address the
phosphorus problem in the lake and its watershed in a cost-effective way.
The theoretical promise of market-based systems to assist in meeting water quality
standards at an overall lower cost than conventional regulatory approaches and the
encouragement from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), has led to
significant attention to water quality trading as a policy alternative to support TMDL
implementation (Horan and Shortle, 2011). In general, water quality trading programs
utilize a market-based approach that allows sources to comply with their regulatory
obligations by using reductions achieved by other sources. These additional reductions
generally translate into credits with a monetary value that may be sold to sources with
high marginal abatement costs within the watershed (Field and Field, 2006). Advantages
of market-based approaches include the involvement of non-regulated nonpoint sources
to address watershed water quality impairment problems (Shortle and Horan, 2006). In
addition, these incentive-based alternatives offer flexibility to pollution sources to find
cost-effective means of meeting individual loading limits (Collentine, 2006).
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The current study builds on a previous investigation conducted by Corrales et al.
(2014), which designed a modeling framework to quantify TP loadings from nonpoint
sources and evaluate the cost savings that could potentially result from implementing a
WQTP, in comparison to a conventional regulatory or command-and-control (CAC)
approach. Several novel aspects were examined in the present study. First and foremost,
the phosphorus sources allowed to participate in the trading program were extended to
both nonpoint and point sources. Indeed, a more diverse pool of trading sources could
increase the potential financial attractiveness of the program by creating differences in
the control costs faced by individual sources (Newell and Stavins, 2003). Second, the
geographic boundaries of the study areas were expanded to two larger and more
hydrological complex sub-watersheds than the region examined in Corrales et al. (2014).
Third, recognizing that the potential economic gains associated with trading are
influenced by diverse factors specific to the trading area (USEPA, 2003c), this paper
assessed the potential cost savings of a trading program in two sub-watersheds with a
direct or an indirect discharge location relative to LO and with distinct land use
characteristics. Fourth, the optimal cap per study area was selected through an
optimization process considering several factors impacting the market potential, namely
the least-cost solutions, credit prices, potential cost savings, and credit supply and
demand. Hypothetical trading scenarios were also developed, using the optimal caps
selected for the two sub-watersheds, to highlight the economic advantages of a WQTP
over a CAC approach in order to improve LO’s water quality.
Furthermore, the present study is intended to provide the public and private sectors
with critical information to assess the environmental and economic potential of WQTPs
114

to reduce TP loadings into LO and to determine whether WQTPs are worth further
exploration and development. Although the potential of a WQTP is illustrated here
through case studies, the same analysis could be applied in other watersheds to explore
the feasibility of a trading program in order to achieve water quality goals in a costeffective way.
4.2. Materials and Methods
4.2.1. Study areas description
The Lake Okeechobee watershed (LOW), divided in nine sub-watersheds on the basis
of hydrology and geography, drains into Lake Okeechobee (LO) (Figure 4-1). Two subwatersheds, Upper Kissimmee (UK) and Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS), were
used as study areas to evaluate and compare the cost effectiveness of implementing a
water quality trading program (WQTP) to reduce the phosphorus emissions reaching LO.
The two sub-watersheds have different land use and hydrologic characteristics and have
been identified as major sources of total phosphorus (TP) loadings to the lake. In the case
of the UK sub-watershed, TP loads are mainly the result of high surface water flows
(Sharfstein et al., 2015). In the case of the TCNS sub-watershed, TP loads are associated
to high TP loads per unit area originating from dairy farms and beef cattle ranches
(Hiscock et al., 2003; Zhao et al., 2012). Therefore, water quality improvements in these
areas could significantly contribute to reducing TP loadings to LO.
Upper Kissimmee sub-watershed
The UK sub-watershed, located north of LO, covers approximately 4,150 km2
(414,994 ha), representing 35% of the total drainage area of the lake. Lake Kissimmee

115

and the Chain of Lakes in Orange and Osceola counties (SFWMD et al., 2011) are
located in the UK sub-watershed and represent the major hydrologic components of the
area (Figure 4-2a). The land use in the UK sub-watershed is mainly composed of natural
areas (56%), such as wetlands, forest, and water bodies; followed by agricultural areas
(24%), including citrus groves, improved pastures, and sod farms, and by urban areas
(21%), such as residential, commercial, industrial, and institutional areas (Table 4-1). In
addition, the largest wastewater facilities within the LOW are located in this subwatershed. With a historical average annual rainfall of 1,272 mm (Abtew and Ciuca,
2015), runoff from the UK sub-watershed is directly reaching the Kissimmee River (C-38
canal) through the S-65 spillway and passes through several downstream basins before
reaching LO. As a result of the large surface flows, this sub-watershed contributes
significant TP loads into the lake. According to the data from the South Florida Water
Management District (SFWMD) DBHYDRO database, the UK sub-watershed accounted
for approximately 39% (750,170 acre-feet) of the total inflow and 18% (77.3 mtons) of
TP loads to LO for the period from 2000 – 2013.
Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough sub-watershed
The TCNS sub-watershed covers 7% (785 km2) of the LOW and drains into LO from
the northeast through the S-191 flow control structure (Figure 4-2b). The hydrology is
dominated by creeks, sloughs, and canals. The historical average annual rainfall is 1,168
mm (Abtew and Ciuca, 2015), and the land use of this sub-watershed is mainly
constituted of agricultural lands (67%), such as improved pastures, dairy farms, and
sugarcane, natural areas (20%), as well as urban areas (13%) (Table 4-1). Because of the
large TP loads generated from this sub-watershed, it has been listed as a priority area for
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the implementation of several TP source control programs. According to the data from
DBHYDRO, the TCNS sub-watershed accounted for approximately 22% (93.0 mtons) of
the TP loads discharged to LO for the period from 2000 – 2013.
4.2.2. Identification of sources of phosphorus and quantification of loadings
Point sources
Point sources (PS) are pollution sources that have a confined and identifiable effluent
location, such as wastewater treatment facilities (WWTFs) and concentrated animal
feeding operations (CAFOs), where animals are maintained in confined situations. Any
PS discharging to surface waters is subject to the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection’s (FDEP) federally authorized National Pollutant Discharged Elimination
System (NPDES) requirements. The UK sub-watershed has 115 domestic and industrial
wastewater facilities with a total permitted flow capacity of 145 million gallons per day
(MGD) (FDEP, 2015). The majority of these facilities use conventional secondary
biological treatment processes typically designed to remove suspended solids and organic
compounds and a lesser extent, to remove nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorus). In
addition, these facilities sell their reclaimed water for reuse purposes to further reduce
nutrient and other contaminant loads. Only two facilities are equipped with Advanced
Wastewater Treatment (AWT) systems specifically designed to remove nutrients. In the
TCNS sub-watershed, there are 26 domestic and industrial facilities, nine of which are
concentrated cow/calf feeding operations (CAFOs), and only one facility with
implemented AWT technology have a design flow capacity greater than 1 MGD. Given
that WWTFs are increasingly being required to implement advanced treatment processes
to reduce effluent concentrations to levels that regulators deem sufficiently protective of
117

the environment, this study focused on facilities with a permitted flow capacity exceeding
1 MGD and that do not have AWT systems currently in place (TP concentration
exceeding 0.1 mg L-1). Facilities with a permitted flow less than 1 MGD account only for
4% of the total combined flow in the two studied sub-watersheds (147.6 MGD) and
therefore, are not expected to be significant phosphorus loading contributors. A TP
concentration of 0.1 mg L-1 was used to select facilities with no AWT technologies (on
the basis of performance data from 30 different facilities) (USEPA, 2008). According to
the above selection criteria, Figure 4-3a shows the location of the PS selected for this
study (i.e., 12 WWTFs with a combined permitted daily flow of 108 MGD), all located in
the UK sub-watershed. The TP loads discharged at the end-of-pipe from these WWTFs
was quantified using the TP effluent concentrations and on the average water flows from
the monitoring reports obtained from the FDEP OCULUS database (FDEP, 2015). The
time period used to calculate TP loads differed for each facility and was determined by
available information of TP effluent concentrations.
It is worth mentioning that all the CAFOs were located in the TCNS sub-watershed
(Figure 4-3b) and were also included in the analysis. The CAFO TP loadings were
quantified using the same methodology used to determine the nonpoint sources’ TP
loadings.
Nonpoint sources
Nonpoint sources (NPS) are polluting sources discharging over relative large diffuse
areas. Examples of NPS are runoffs originating from agricultural and urban areas. The
location and type of NPS within the study areas were determined using the 2006 land use
classification obtained from the SFWMD Geographical Information System (GIS)
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database (SFWMD, 2014). Figures 4-4a and 4-4b show the land use distribution for the
UK and the TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively.
Given that NPS pollution discharges depend on several exogenous factors including
land use, topography, vegetation, and sediment generation (Zhang et al., 2015), direct
measurement of TP load discharges and removal efficiencies of different control
practices is a challenging and often a very expensive task. Therefore, WQTPs rely on
computer models and/or web-based platforms using site characteristics, such as rainfall,
land use, and soil types to simulate the constituent loads generated at the source level. For
instance, Zhang et al. (2015) used the Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) to
simulate NPS contaminant loadings from agricultural zones for trading purposes in the
Xiangxihe River watershed (China). Trading programs in the Kalamazoo River
watershed (MI, USA) and the Chesapeake Bay watershed (USA) use the standardized
nutrient loading estimation tool –NutrientNet-- to estimate loadings and potential
reductions of different management strategies (Lal et al., 2009). In the present study, the
Watershed Assessment Model (WAM) developed by Soil and Water Engineering
Technology, Inc. was used as a TP load estimation tool at the source, stream, and subwatershed outfall levels. A detailed description of the model can be found in Corrales et
al. (2014). The WAM model dynamically routes the flows and constituent loads to and
through the stream network to the discharge location, allowing the quantification of the
un-attenuated constituent loads (at the source level) and the attenuated loads (at the
nearby stream system), after overland assimilation has been taken into account (SWET,
2011). The model has been extensively used in the LOW for a variety of projects (SWET,
2011) and it was recently applied by the FDEP for the LO Basin Management Action
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Plan (BMAP) development (FDEP, 2014). For the purpose of the present study, WAM
was calibrated and validated for the UK sub-watershed and for three of the four basins of
the TCNS sub-watershed (S-133, S-135, and S-154) (Figure 4-2b) for a simulation period
from 2002 – 2009. Results of the calibration and validation analysis and goodness-of-fit
(GOF) statistical measurements are reported in the Supplemental Information. The
simulation period (2002 – 2009) was selected for the present study, because during this
period minimal Best Management Practices (BMPs) were implemented in the two subwatersheds to reduce nutrient loadings from agricultural and urban areas (FDEP, 2014).
4.2.3. Determination of attenuation rates and delivery trading ratios
The TP loads from PS and NPS can be land and water assimilated through several
physical-chemical-biological processes (Zhang et al., 2002). For TP loads generated from
NPS, the overland attenuation was calculated using the WAM model as different
attenuation rates were applied to nutrient loads depending on the type of landscape
feature encountered en-route to a nearby reach (SWET, 2011). For TP loads generated
from PS, an attenuation factor of 90% was used in order to estimate the TP loads
attenuated to the nearby stream. The overland attenuation factor, taken from published
data (Crites et al., 2000; Evanylo et al., 2010; USEPA, 2003b), reflects the attenuation of
TP in reclaimed water discharged to a slow-rate public access reuse system, consisting of
irrigation of residential lawns, golf courses, and landscape areas. In the present case,
although the reclaimed water from PS was not directly discharged to a surface waterbody,
it was assumed that the surface and groundwater catchment areas were similar in the subwatersheds. Therefore, the TP loads from PS were attributed to the WAM reach
associated with the drainage area where the PS is located.
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The in-stream phosphorus attenuation was used to account for additional TP
assimilation as different hydrologic conveyance features, such as slough, streams, and
canals are encountered en-route to the sub-watershed outlet. A first order decay equation
(Equation 4-1) was used to attenuate TP loads from the nearby stream to the subwatershed outlets. The main factors influencing the in-stream attenuation are the stream
velocity and the rate of nutrient exchange between the water column and sediments
(Corrales et al., 2014).
C f = C b + (C o − C b ) ∗ e

 a
− 
 v

(4-1)

where C f is the TP concentration at the outlet of the sub-watershed (mg L-1), C o is the
TP concentration at the outlet of each reach segment (mg L-1), C b is the TP background
concentration in the stream (mg L-1), v is the stream velocity (m s-1), and a is the rate of
load transfer (m s-1) referring to the rate at which TP is removed from the water column
and retained in the stream sediments.
Values of C b and a were calibrated for the UK sub-watershed and for the S-133, S135, and S-154 basins. Final values of C b and a are reported in the Appendix for the two
phosphorus forms: soluble (dissolved in the water) and non-soluble (attached to sediment
particles).
Attenuation ratios were calculated using the difference in TP load attenuated to the
sub-watershed outlet and the TP load attenuated to the nearby stream. Each subwatershed was then classified into zones defined by the attenuation ratio values, using the
natural breaks (Jenks) classification method provided in ArcMap. The TP loads
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aggregated by zone represented the current average annual TP load per source considered
in the analysis.
Attenuation rate values were used to estimate the delivery trading ratios (TRs) using
Equation (4-2).

The TRs were incorporated in the WQTP to provide equivalence

between trading sources located at different distances relative to the impaired waterbody
(Corrales et al., 2013; Feng et al., 2009). The TRs are an important feature of a WQTP,
because they ensure that pollutant load reductions achieved at the seller’s location would
result in the same or better environmental improvement in the receiving waterbody than
reductions attained at the buyer’s location (USEPA, 2003c).
TR =

(1 − Buyer ' s attenuation factor )
(1 − Seller ' s attenuation factor )

(4-2)

Once the TRs were assessed, the amount of credits needed from a potential buyer was
adjusted using the buyer zone’s TR to ensure that the proposed trade did not result in
localized areas of high TP load or “hotspots”.
4.2.4. Phosphorus abatement approaches
Least-cost abatement approach
In the present study, an extended version of the conceptual model developed in
Corrales et al. (2014) was used to minimize the total costs of abating TP loads to achieve
specific reduction TP targets. Similar models have been used in other studies to
determine the least-cost load allocation to meet a given water quality goal (Van Houtven
et al., 2012). The novel component of the present study is that the least-cost abatement
(LCA) model was extended to include the participation of both PS and NPS to simulate a
market-based WQTP. The allocation of a water quality goal for each sub-watershed was
122

optimized among trading sources in such a way that sources with low marginal abatement
costs would have higher TP reductions than sources with high marginal abatement costs,
allowing reaching economic efficiency while achieving specific TP reduction targets. The
LCA model approach, described in Equations (4-3) – (4-6), was solved using the General
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) software. Table 4-2 provides the description and
units of the variables used in the model.
Min Z = ∑∑∑ ci ,k , j × X i ,k , j + ∑∑∑ ci ,m ,n × Yi ,m ,n
i

k

i

j

m

(4-3)

n

Subject to:

∑∑∑ L

i, j

i

k

∑X

j

i, k , j

× rk , j × X i ,k , j + ∑∑∑ Li ,n × rm ,n × Yi ,m ,n ≥ Target _ Pred
i

m

(4-4)

n

≤ 1 ∀i, k , j

(4-5)

≤ 1 ∀i, m, n

(4-6)

k

∑Y

i ,m,n

m

The objective function Min Z, represented in Equation (4-3), was set to minimize the
cost of implementing 1) agricultural and urban BMPs for NPS and 2) AWT technologies
for PS. The first constraint, presented in Equation (4-4), reflects that the sum of TP load
reductions from NPS and PS in each zone (i), after implementing a BMP (k) and/or an
AWT technology type (m), needs to meet a pre-set TP load reduction target
(Target_P red ). The second and third constraints, presented in Equations (4-5) and (4-6),
are using a binary variable (0 or 1) to indicate if a BMP or an AWT technology was
implemented or not. For instance, a value of 1 is used when a BMP type (k) was adopted
by NPS (j) in zone (i), and 0 otherwise.
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The NPS BMP cost efficiency (TP load reductions and associated costs) were
determined using estimates developed for the LOW for the three BMPs categories (i.e.,
owner, typical, and alternative) (SWET, 2006). These estimates were set on the basis of
an extensive literature review, observed data, and modeling projects around Florida
(SWET, 2008). Owner-type BMPs refer to nutrient management practices, such as
reducing fertilizer application. Typical and alternative types of BMPs are structural
practices involving the construction of more capital-intensive practices, such as adding
structures that retain water on-site for longer periods of time or edge-of-field predischarge treatment systems (Bottcher et al., 1995). The PS AWT cost efficiency (TP
load reductions and associated annual costs for a wide range of flow rates) were
determined using values developed by USEPA (2008) examining different AWT retrofit
technologies that involve modifying or making additions around an existing biological
treatment system. The reported cost estimates were used to derive capital cost and
operational and maintenance (O&M) cost functions for two groups of technologies:
medium effluent TP target (average TP concentration of 0.5 mg L-1) and low effluent TP
target (average TP concentration of 0.1 mg L-1). These two groups were selected on the
basis of the fact that the performance of the treatment processes at the WWTFs, evaluated
in the USEPA (2008) study, could reach mid-level TP concentrations (between 0.1 to 0.5
mg L-1) or low TP concentrations (less than 0.1 mg L-1). Table 4-3 presents TP reduction
efficiencies and unit annual costs ($ per kilogram of TP removed) for agricultural and
urban BMPs, and for AWT retrofit technologies used in this study. All costs were
indexed to 2012 dollars using the Consumer Price Index inflation calculation.
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Command-and-control approach
A command-and-control (CAC), also known as a conventional approach, is when a
regulatory agency outlines specific effluent water quality standards or particular control
technologies that are deemed to be protective for impaired waterbodies and their
designated uses (Field and Field, 2006).

In the present study, the CAC approach

represents the baseline (no-trading) scenario to which the WQTP would be compared to
in order to evaluate the potential economic benefits in each sub-watershed. Under the
CAC approach, the TP water quality goal for each sub-watershed was allocated for PS,
using the total TP amount that would be discharged if an AWT technology was adopted
in each WWTF to reach an end-of-pipe effluent target TP concentration of 0.1 mg L-1.
For NPS, the allocation was defined as the difference between the water quality goal and
the PS allocation. The allocated TP load allocation was then distributed among all NPS
depending on the land aerial coverage; the resulting load per hectare (kg P ha-1 yr-1)
represents the maximum TP load rate allowed to be discharged from different NPS types.
Therefore, while the maximum TP load allowed to be discharged from PS remains fixed
under this abatement approach, the TP load permitted from NPS is dependent on the preset sub-watershed water quality goal. As opposed to the LCA approach, the selection of
management alternatives applied to each source is reliant on the best available BMP or
technology to comply with an individual TP load allocation.
4.2.5.Setting the cap of a water quality trading program through an optimization
process
The cap is generally defined as the maximum pollutant amount allowed to be
discharged from all trading sources in an impaired watershed for a given period of time.
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The cap can be defined in terms of load, concentration, or percent reduction targets. In
theory, the most economically efficient level for the emission cap implies a balance
between abatement costs and damages (Field and Field, 2006). However, it is often the
case that environmental damages are difficult to measure accurately. Therefore, in
practice, policymakers determine the cap level by considering a combination of factors,
such as cost-effectiveness, fairness, and political feasibility.
In the present study, different caps were evaluated and their implications on the
market potential were analyzed while evaluating four different factors: 1) least-cost
abatement solutions, 2) credit price derived from a market supply curve, 3) potential cost
savings of the LCA scenario in comparison with the CAC approach, and 4) supply and
demand of credits. The selection of the cap level affects each of these factors which in
turn would ultimately influence the efficiency of a WQTP for meeting certain TP loading
abatement levels. An optimization process was developed using these factors to select the
most appropriate cap for each of the studied sub-watersheds in order to have a viable and
sustainable TP trading program.
For comparison purposes, trading scenarios were developed using the optimal TP
caps selected for each sub-watershed. For each trading scenario, the buyer and seller
sources were identified, credit prices and the amount of trades were estimated, cost of
credits for individual sources were assessed while considering TRs and transaction fees,
and finally the overall WQTP cost savings relative to a CAC approach were evaluated. A
10 % of the credit price was added to the cost of the credits as a transaction fee in order to
account for the time and resources needed to implement a trade (e.g., information
gathering, negotiation, execution, and monitoring).
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4.3. Results and Discussion
4.3.1. Phosphorus loads by source
Upper Kissimmee sub-watershed
Annual average TP load values estimated at the source (cell) level, attenuated to the
nearby stream, and attenuated to the outlet of the UK sub-watershed are reported in Table
4-4. The total TP loads generated at the source level were 268.6 mtons yr-1 (55%) and
217.2 mtons yr-1 (45%), from NPS and PS, respectively, for a combined total TP load of
485.9 mtons yr-1 in the runoff. Sod farms, field crops, and ornamental land uses had the
highest TP fluxes per hectare at the farm level with 8.1, 5.2, and 3.9 kg ha-1 yr-1,
respectively. The same range of values was found in other studies reporting TP loads at
the farm level of 6.6, 1.5, and 2.4 kg ha-1 yr-1, respectively for the same land use types in
South Florida (He et al., 2014). Citrus, improved pastures, and urban land uses had TP
fluxes of 0.6, 1.5, and 1.1 kg ha-1 yr-1, respectively, which are values comparable to the
ones reported by Boggess et al. (1995). Figure 4-5a depicts the spatial distribution of the
TP fluxes at the source level and the location of hotspot areas within the UK subwatershed. The total annual average TP loads from all sources (including natural areas)
reaching the nearby stream and the sub-watershed outlet were 111.2 and 99 mtons yr-1,
respectively (Table 4-4). The average monitored TP loading (obtained from the SFWMD
DBHYDRO database) at the S-65 structure for the same time period (2002 – 2009) was
about 105 mtons yr-1, close to the modeled value of 99 mtons yr-1. The TP sources, such
as WWTFs, urban areas, and improved pastures had the highest TP load contribution to
the outlet of the UK sub-watershed, accounting for 20.2, 19.6, and 16.3% of the total TP
loading, respectively. It is worth mentioning that since TP loadings leaving the UK sub127

watershed flow through the downstream Lower Kissimmee (LK) sub-watershed before
reaching LO, a downstream attenuation factor of 30% was used to estimate the TP
loading contribution from UK sub-watershed reaching the lake. The downstream
attenuation factor, taken from the FDEP (2014) report, reflects the overland and in-stream
attenuation associated to the LK sub-watershed. Hence, the total TP loading contribution
from the UK sub-watershed reaching LO was 69.3 mtons yr-1.
Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough sub-watershed
Annual average TP load values from NPS and PS are presented in Table 4-5 for the
TCNS sub-watershed. The NPS TP loads simulated at the source level were 110.5 mtons
yr-1. Improved pastures, covering almost 47% of the study area, were the major TP source
accounting for 46.3% (69.4 mtons yr-1) of the total TP load discharged at the source level.
In addition, TP loads from CAFOs represented 26% (39.3 mtons yr-1) of the total TP
loading generated at the source level. The CAFOs had the highest TP load rate per area at
the source level with 9.9 kg ha-1 yr-1, followed by ornamentals and field crop land uses
with 8.0 and 5.9 kg ha-1 yr-1, respectively. These TP values were consistent with estimates
reported in a previous study conducted by Corrales et al. (2014) in the S-191 basin, where
TP fluxes at the source level were 10.5, 9.0, and 5.9 kg ha-1 yr-1 for dairy, ornamentals,
and field crop land use types, respectively. The TP fluxes of citrus, improved pastures,
and sod land uses were also consistent with values reported by He et al. (2014) of 0.7,
1.5, and 6.6 kg ha-1 yr-1, respectively. The red areas depicted in Figure 4-5b indicate the
location of the areas with the highest TP fluxes. The total annual average TP loads from
all sources (including natural areas) reaching the nearby stream and the sub-watershed
outlet were 124.9 and 115.7 mtons yr-1, respectively. The average monitored TP loading
128

(obtained from the SFWMD DBHYDRO database) at the S-191 structure for the same
time period (2002 – 2009) was about 107 mtons yr-1, close to the modeled value of 115.7
mtons yr-1. Downstream attenuation was not considered in this sub-watershed, since it
directly discharges into LO.
In order to develop the two phosphorus abatement approaches (LCA and CAC), TP
loadings generated from natural sources (significantly important in the UK subwatershed) were not considered in the comparison analysis. Therefore, the TP loadings
set as the baseline before BMP and AWT implementation were 78.7 and 120 mtons yr-1
for the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively.
4.3.2. Attenuation rates and delivery trading ratios
There was a significant difference in the TP load attenuation from the source level to
the nearby hydrologic unit in both sub-watersheds. On average, there was an overland
attenuation of 77 and 17% for the UK and TCNS studied areas, respectively (Tables 4-4
and 4-5).This dissimilarity could be attributed to the high phosphorus assimilation
capacity of natural areas, such as wetlands (Boggess et al., 1995), which are the most
predominant land use types within the UK sub-watershed. TP loads were further
assimilated or retained through reaches and canals by physical and chemical factors
before reaching the outlet of the sub-watershed. Zones with different in-stream
attenuation factors are presented in Figure 4-6. Areas close to the outlet of the two subwatersheds had relatively low attenuation factors (an average of 2%), while some
upstream areas yielded relatively high attenuation factors (an average of 20% for UK and
29% for TCNS). The in-stream attenuation averages were 11 and 7%, respectively for the
UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, coinciding with assimilation rates, ranging from 2 – 20%,
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reported by SWET (2008) for canals and stream conveyance systems in the St. Lucie and
Caloosahatchee River watersheds (FL, USA). In addition, He et al. (2014) reported
average overall (land and stream) assimilation rates of 74 and 33%, agreeing with the
values found in this study of 88 and 24% for the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds,
respectively.
The resulting delivery TRs ranged from 0.82 – 1.23 and from 0.72 – 1.38 for the UK
and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively. Other studies have also used water quality
models to quantify delivery TRs. For instance, FDEP (2010) used the Pollution Load
Screening Model (PLSM) to estimate location factors, ranging from 0.01 – 1.7, in the
Lower St. Johns River basin (FL, USA). TRs were then used to develop trading scenarios
to estimate the amount of credits a buyer would need to purchase in order to offset a
required TP load reduction. A TR less than 1 was used when a buyer purchased credits
from a seller located downstream. Whereas a TR higher than 1 was used when the seller
was located upstream of the buyer’s location. Therefore, from an economic perspective, a
buyer would be more interested to trade credits with a source situated downstream,
thereby increasing the demand of credits generated from sources closer to the discharge
outlet of the sub-watersheds.
4.3.3. Setting the cap of a WQTP scenario in the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds
The TMDL adopted for an impaired waterbody is generally used for setting the cap of
a WQTP as a legal binding mechanism to incentivize regulated sources to seek credits in
a market (Ribaudo and Gottlieb, 2011). Despite this policy driver, an overall low trading
activity has been observed in the majority of the WQTPs. The success of a WQTP relies
heavily on setting the correct binding obligation that can either encourage or hinder the
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participation of trading sources in a credit trading market. For instance, Hamstead and
BenDor (2010) reported that setting a low-level cap for the Neuse River Basin Total
Nitrogen Trading program (NC, USA) was one of the causes of low-trade activity, since
facilities were able to reduce nitrogen loads to compliance levels by technological
improvements implemented on-site. Likewise, stringent caps would leave little room to
provide additional reductions to generate credits, because all available abatement
measures would be already implemented to comply with the cap.
Four factors were considered in this study to determine the most suitable cap (or
reduction target) for a WQTP in each of the sub-watersheds: total annual abatement costs,
credit prices, potential cost savings, and credits supply and demand.
Total annual abatement costs
The total annual costs (in million dollars) incurred from all trading sources when
implementing the least-cost BMP or technology for achieving different sub-watershed TP
load reduction targets are presented in Figures 4-7a and 4-7b for the UK and TCNS subwatersheds, respectively. Overall, the total annual costs for the UK sub-watershed were
five times higher than the costs for the TCNS sub-watershed for the same TP reduction
levels. Figure 4-7 indicates that the total costs and reduction targets are positive
correlated, reaching total annual costs of $ 327.9 and $ 50.3 million for the highest TP
load reduction of 75 and 66% achieved for the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds,
respectively. Figure 4-7a denotes no significant change in the total cost for TP reduction
targets ranging from 5 – 50% for the UK sub-watershed. However, once the reduction
targets exceeded 50%, a substantial increase in the total cost occurred. A similar pattern
was observed in the TCNS sub-watershed for TP reduction targets greater than 60%
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(Figure 4-7b). Therefore, in order to develop trading scenarios while keeping the optimal
cost-effectiveness of the program, TP reduction targets lower than 50 and 60% had to be
selected as the WQTP caps for the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively.
Credit prices
Figure 4-8, representing the aggregated supply curves, illustrate the positive
relationship linking the credit prices and the TP load reduction. Since each point on the
supply curves corresponds to an equilibrium state between the supply and demand of
credits, Figure 4-8 also depicts the credit price that trading sources would be willing to
pay for an additional TP reduction unit. Credit prices in the UK sub-watershed varied
significantly from $ 27 per kilogram for a 5% TP reduction to $ 7,151 per kilogram for
the maximum TP reduction of 75%. On the other hand, credit prices in the TCNS subwatershed ranged from $ 13 per kilogram for a 5% TP reduction to $ 2,216 per kilogram
for the maximum TP reduction of 66%. Implemented WQTPs, such as the Great Miami
River Watershed Trading Pilot program (OH, USA), the Lower St. Johns River Pilot
Water Quality Trading program (FL, USA), and the South Nation River Watershed
Trading program (Canada) reported credit prices of $ 28, $ 152, and $ 410 per kilogram
of TP removed, respectively (Corrales et al., 2013). The market price of the credits can
vary greatly depending on the type of sources or sectors included in the program (Sado et
al., 2010). For instance, in the UK sub-watershed (dominated by urban areas) the credit
price for achieving a 50% TP load reduction was about $ 1000, whereas in the TCNS
sub-watershed (dominated by agricultural areas) the credit price was close to $ 500 for
the same TP reduction level.
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Figure 4-8a also indicates that the knee-of-the-curve fell at the 50% TP reduction
level. Indeed, the credit price increased twofold and sevenfold when TP reduction targets
increased from 50 – 60% and from 50 – 75%, respectively. In the case of the TCNS subwatershed (Figure 4-8b), the knee-of-the-curve fell at the 40% TP reduction level, since
the credit price increased twofold and fivefold when TP reduction targets increased from
40 – 50% and from 40 – 65%, respectively. Therefore, in order to develop trading
scenarios, while keeping an optimal credit price of the program, TP reduction targets
lower than 50 and 40% had to be selected as the WQTP caps for the UK and TCNS subwatersheds, respectively.
Potential cost savings
The cost-effectiveness (i.e., achieving a given level of environmental improvement at
the least possible cost) of the two TP control approaches (CAC and LCA) was evaluated
to select an optimal cap for the WQTPs. The cost-effectiveness is an important criterion
helping policymakers to select pollution control instruments (Goulder and Parry, 2008).
Tables 4-6 and 4-7 provide cost comparison of the LCA and CAC approaches for
achieving different TP reduction levels for the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds,
respectively. Abatement costs ranged from 5 – 86% and from 5 – 58% lower under the
LCA approach than under the CAC scenario in the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds,
respectively. These results illustrate the cost advantage that incentive-based policies offer
over conventional approaches. However, the cost advantage decreased as TP reduction
targets became more stringent, because at high TP reduction levels fewer abatement
alternatives were available to meet the pre-set cap. It would be economically reasonable
to set the cap of a WQTP at the level where trading sources would have the most
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economic benefits or savings with respect to other emission control alternatives (Ravesz
and Stavins, 2004). In the present study, this level was reached when the difference in
total abatement costs between the LCA and CAC approaches was maximized. In the case
of the UK sub-watershed (Table 4-6), the highest potential cost savings ($ 127.2 million
yr-1) were reached for a TP reduction target of 56%. In the case of the TCNS subwatershed (Table 4-7), the highest potential cost savings ($ 4.0 million yr-1) were attained
for a TP reduction target of 30%.
Credit supply and demand
Generating enough credit supply and demand is an important factor in a WQTP since
it is a measure of the degree of competition in the market. In thin markets, with a few
buyers or sellers, competitive pressures are weak or absent, giving the small group of
buyers or sellers to exercise control over the market (Field and Field, 2006). In addition, a
WQTP with few traders could bring several issues related to high transaction costs, price
volatility, and willingness to participate (USEPA, 2003a). Tables 4-8 and 4-9 present the
number of credits available to be sold in the market and the number of potential buyers
and sellers in the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively. Potential credit buyers
were identified whenever TP loadings under the LCA approach were higher than those
obtained under the CAC approach. On the other hand, sources discharging below their
CAC load were identified as potential credit sellers. An inverse relationship between the
TP reduction target and the number of potential sellers was observed. Hence, WQTPs
become a seller-dominated market with more stringent caps. The potential for the
creation of thin markets was more evident in the UK sub-watershed since there were only
two potential buyers identified at a TP reduction target of 56% and one potential buyer at
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a TP reduction target of 61%. In this sub-watershed, a large and almost equal number of
buyers and sellers was observed for a TP reduction level of 46%, thus creating a
competitive market scenario. In the case of the TCNS sub-watershed, the potential
volume of trades was comparable for all TP reduction levels.
Integrating the four factors influencing the cap level (Figure 4-9) and in order to
foster competition for a viable and sustainable trading program in the two studied areas,
TP reduction targets of 46 and 32% were selected as the most appropriate reduction
levels for the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively.
4.3.4. Comparing CAC and LCA scenarios
Figure 4-10 illustrates the combination of BMPs and AWT technologies that were
selected under the CAC approach (Figure 4-10a) and under the LCA approach (Figure 410b), in order to meet the 46% TP reduction target in the UK sub-watershed. Under the
CAC approach, citrus, improved pastures, and rangeland and wooded pastures (across all
zones in this sub-watershed) were either already in compliance with their individual
allocations or were supposed to implement BMP types I or II (i.e., owner and typical
types of BMPs, respectively). In contrast, under the optimized LCA approach, these
sources were selected to implement additional TP load reduction efforts given their low
marginal abatement cost relative to other pollution sources. On the other hand, WWTFs,
sod farms, and urban areas were selected to implement less expensive technologies and
management practices under the LAC approach, and bought credits from other sources to
reach their load allocations.
Figure 4-11 shows the BMP types that each pollution source needed to implement
(across all zones) under the two TP abatement approaches, in order to meet the
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aggregated TP load reduction target of 32% for the TCNS sub-watershed. Under the CAC
approach (Figure 4-11a), citrus, sugarcane, and urban areas were already in compliance
with their individual allocations, whereas CAFOs, field crops, and ornamentals had to
implement the most advanced alternative type of BMP (BMP III) to reach their individual
TP load requirements. Under the LCA optimized approach (Figure 4-11b), citrus,
sugarcane, and urban areas were selected to reduce their TP loads beyond their baseline
by implementing BMP type I with minimal additional costs. On the other hand, CAFOs
and ornamentals reduced their annual investment by implementing BMP types I and II,
instead of the more capital intensive BMP type III required under the CAC approach.
Table 4-10 lists the credit prices, number of credits traded, and net cost savings
estimated for the WQTP scenarios developed in the two studied areas using the selected
TP load reduction targets. Credit prices were of $ 673 and $ 130 per kilogram of TP
reduced for the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively. The number of credits
traded was 73% (4,601 credits) and 50% (10,495 credits) of the total available TP credits
for the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively. In the UK sub-watershed, the major
sellers were improved and unimproved pastures, and the major buyers were the WWTFs
and urban areas, selling and purchasing 84 and 76% of the total credits traded,
respectively. In the TCNS sub-watershed, improved pastures and CAFOs dominated the
market as sellers and buyers of 94 and 86% of the credits traded, respectively. Although
sellers incurred an additional cost of $ 2.1 and $ 1.0 million for implementing more
BMPs in the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively, they sold credits for $ 3.1 and
$ 1.4 million, representing an annual cost savings of $ 956,625 in the UK and $ 337,778
in the TCNS sub-watersheds. Even with the transaction fees, the annual cost savings were
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higher for buyers participating in the trading program, representing 97 and 89% of the
total cost savings for the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively. The estimated net
cost savings resulting from implementing a WQTP in the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds
were 76% ($ 34.9 million per year) and 45% ($ 3.2 million per year), respectively.
Feasibility assessments of the potential of a WQTP in other watersheds have yielded
similar percentages of potential cost savings. For instance, Faeth (2000) investigated the
potential for trading in three upper Midwest states (Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota)
and found in each case cost savings of between 43 and 88% to meet or exceed water
quality targets, compared to more stringent point source performance requirements. In
addition, Van Houtven et al. (2012) estimated potential cost savings of 82% for the
Chesapeake Bay watershed when considering a nutrient trading scenario over a notrading scenario. In addition, the net cost savings estimated in this study were higher than
the net cost savings obtained by Corrales et al. (2014), a study conducted in a small area
in LOW (S-191 basin). Thus, the cost savings generated from a WQTP generally
increases when the geographic boundary of the program is extended and more diverse
sources are included (Newell and Stavins, 2003; Van Houtven et al., 2012). Nevertheless,
it is worth mentioning that the market suitability and financial attractiveness of a WQTP
could vary depending on the market structure established to facilitate trading (Ribaudo
and Gottlieb, 2011; Woodward et al., 2002), risk perceptions of pollution sources
(Hamstead and BenDor, 2010; Horan, 2001), on trusted and effective relationships
among regulatory agencies, public sector, and other stakeholders (Newburn and
Woodward, 2012), and on the specific trading rules determined by regulators (Horan and
Shortle, 2011).
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4.4. Conclusions
This study explored the environmental and economic feasibility of a WQTP over a
CAC approach in two sub-watersheds within the LOW. The Upper Kissimmee (UK) and
the Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS) studied areas were selected since the two sub
watersheds are a major TP loading source discharging into LO. Sod farms and CAFOs
were identified as the major sources of TP load per area (at the source level) in the UK
and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively. Furthermore, delivery TRs of 0.98 – 1.23 for
UK and 0.72 – 1.38 for TCNS were set using the attenuation rates estimated with the
hydrologic and water quality WAM model. The financial feasibility of the WQTP was
assessed while evaluating the effect of different TP caps on the potential for a credit
market in each of the two sub-watersheds. Four factors influencing the selection of the
cap were analyzed: total abatement costs under the least-cost solution, credit price,
potential cost savings, and credit supply and demand. While attaining cost-effectiveness,
keeping optimal credit prices, and fostering market competition, TP reduction targets of
46 and 32% were selected as the most appropriate TP caps, in order to develop a viable
and sustainable trading scenario in the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively. The
estimated net cost savings resulting from implementing a WQTP in the UK and TCNS
sub-watersheds were 76% ($ 34.9 million per year) and 45% ($ 3.2 million per year),
respectively. Buyer sources, such as WWTFs and urban areas acquired 97% of the total
cost savings estimated through trading in the UK sub-watershed. Likewise, 89% of the
total estimated cost savings in the TCNS were attributed to offsetting CAFOs TP loading
requirements from other sources. While the results of this study are promising, the
realization of the environmental and economic benefits of this market-based alternative is
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also contingent on other important factors such as the market structure, the specific
program rules, the risk perception, and the education and outreach to develop trusted
relationships among regulatory agencies, the public sector, and other stakeholders.
Nevertheless, this study provided some critical results to facilitate the development of
pilot WQTPs in the LOW and to better understand the potential economic opportunities
that TP sources would have by participating in a WQTP.
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4.6. Tables
Table 4-1. Land use data for Upper Kissimmee (UK) and Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough
(TCNS) sub-watersheds.

Land Use
Citrus
Improved Pastures
Unimproved Pastures
Rangeland and Wooded Pasture
Dairies
Field Crops
Ornamentals
Row Crops
Sod
Sugarcane
Urban
Natural Areas
Total

UK
Area
Percent
(ha)
(%)
23,088
5.6%
53,444
12.9%
11,893
2.9%
2,328
0.6%
36
0.0%
636
0.2%
232
0.1%
1,394
0.3%
3,653
0.9%
0.0%
87,881
21.2%
230,409
55.5%
414,994
100.0%

TCNS
Area
Percent
(ha)
(%)
1,483
1.9%
37,110
47.2%
1,982
2.5%
283
0.4%
3,978
5.1%
1,756
2.2%
502
0.6%
213
0.3%
1,311
1.7%
3,649
4.6%
10,444
13.3%
15,834
20.2%
78,545
100.0%

Table 4-2. Description of the variables used in the optimization model.
Symbol
i
j
k
n
m
c i,k,j
c i,m,n
X i,k,j
Y i,k,j
r k,j
r m,n
L i,j
L i,n
Target_P red

Description
Set of sub-watershed zones with different percent of attenuation
Set of land uses representing NPS (agricultural and urban sources)
Set of best management practices (BMPs) types to apply in NPS
Set of wastewater treatment facilities (WWTFs) representing PS
Set of advanced wastewater treatment (AWT) technologies types to apply
in PS
Annual cost of implementing a BMP (k) at a NPS (j) in zone (i)
Annual cost of implementing an AWT technology (m) at PS (n) in zone (i)
Binary variable with a value of 1 if a BMP (k) is implemented, 0 otherwise
Binary variable with a value of 1 if an AWT technology (m) is
implemented, 0 otherwise
Percent TP load reduction attained when implementing a BMP (k) at NPS
(j)
Percent TP load reduction attained when applying an AWT technology type
(m) at PS (n)
Current TP load from NPS (j) located in zone (i) at the zone level
Current TP load from PS (n) located in zone (i) at the zone level
TP load reduction from NPS and PS at the zone level when following the
command-and-control approach

NPS: Nonpoint sources; PS: Point sources; TP: Total phosphorus.
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Units

$ yr-1
$ yr-1
kg yr-1
kg yr-1
kg yr-1

Table 4-3. Best management practices (BMPs) and advanced wastewater treatment
(AWT) technologies total phosphorus (TP) reduction efficiencies (%) and annual unit
costs ($ kg-1 reduced) for Upper Kissimmee (UK) and Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough
(TCNS) sub-watersheds.
TCNS

UK

BMP I

BMP II

BMP III
BMP I
BMP II
BMP III

AWT I

AWT II

Reduction
Efficiency
(%)
Agricultural BMPs*
Reduce phosphorus fertilization,
better nutrient management, grass
4 - 30%
management
Stormwater R/D, wetland
restoration, water management,
10 - 65%
rotational grazing, new water
facilities, critical area fencing

Unit Cost
($ kg-1 reduced)

$ 0 – 828

$ 0 – 76

$ 99 – 33,811

$ 24 – 883

Edge-of-farm stormwater R/D
40 - 85% $ 204 – 28,461
and chemical treatment
Urban BMPs*
Reduce phosphorus fertilization
5%
$0
Limited dry retention, street
sweeping, sediment R/D and
10%
$ 18,349
wetland restoration
Stormwater R/D and chemical
73%
$ 18,601
treatment
WWTF AWT Technologies**
Fermenter retrofit, 1-point
chemical addition, fermenter with 50 - 87%
$ 115 – 612
sand filter
Fermenter with sand filter plus 1point chemical addition , 2-point
90 - 98%
$ 219 – 945
chemical addition

$ 49 – 1,537
$0
$ 7,693
$ 7,799

-

-

BMP I: Owner type BMP; BMP II: Owner and typical BMPs; BMP III: Owner, typical, and
alternative BMPs.
AWT I: Treatment technology reaching a target TP concentration of 0.5 mg L-1; AWT II: Treatment
technology reaching a target TP concentration of 0.1 mg L-1.
* Annual unit costs for agricultural and urban BMPs include amortized capital costs at 10% interest
over a 20-year life span. The annual O&M costs were determined using the 20% of the annualized
capital cost.
** Annual unit costs for AWT technologies include the annualized capital and O&M costs using an
amortization of 6% interest over a 20-year life span for the capital costs.
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Table 4-4. Average Annual Total Phosphorus (TP) load per source in the Upper
Kissimmee (UK) sub-watershed.

Source

Nonpoint Sources
Citrus
Improved pasture
Unimproved pasture
Rangeland and
wooded pasture
Field crops
Ornamentals
Row crops
Sod
Urban
Natural areas
Sub-total
Point Sources
WWTFs
Total

TP load at
the source
level
(mtons yr-1)

TP load flux
at the source
(kg ha-1 yr-1)

TP load
attenuated
to the
nearby
stream
(mtons yr-1)

10.9
65.8
7.4

0.5
1.2
0.6

3.7
18.1
2.7

3.2 (3.2%)
16.1 (16.3%)
2.4 (2.4%)

3.1

1.3

0.9

0.8 (0.8%)

3.3
0.9
3.9
29.7
71.6
72.1
268.6

5.2
3.9
2.8
8.1
0.8
0.3
0.6

0.7
0.1
1.3
6.5
22.2
32.5
88.7

0.6 (0.7%)
0.1 (0.1%)
1.2 (1.2%)
5.9 (6%)
19.4 (19.6%)
29.0 (29.3%)
79.0 (79.8%)

217.2
485.9

n/a
0.6

22.5
111.2

20.0 (20.2%)
99.0 (100%)

WWTF: Wastewater treatment facilities.
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TP load
attenuated to
the outlet
(mtons yr-1)

Table 4-5. Average Annual Total Phosphorus (TP) load per source in the Taylor
Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS) sub-watershed.

Source

TP load at
the source
level
(mtons yr-1)

TP load flux
at the source
(kg ha-1 yr-1)

TP load
attenuated
to the
nearby
stream
(mtons yr-1)

1.3
69.4
1.3

0.9
1.9
0.7

1.3
59.4
1.2

1.2 (1.0%)
54.6 (47.2%)
1.1 (1.0%)

0.3

1.1

0.3

0.3 (0.2%)

10.4
4.0
0.5
5.3
1.5
10.2
6.3
110.5

5.9
8.0
2.4
4.1
0.4
1.0
0.4
1.5

8.5
3.4
0.5
4.6
1.2
6.3
4.9
91.5

8.0 (6.9%)
3.2 (2.8%)
0.4 (0.4%)
4.1 (3.6%)
1.2 (1.0%)
5.8 (5.0%)
4.5 (3.8%)
84.3 (72.8%)

39.3
149.8

9.9
1.9

33.4
124.9

31.4 (27.2%)
115.7 (100%)

Nonpoint Sources
Citrus
Improved pasture
Unimproved pasture
Rangeland and
wooded pasture
Field crops
Ornamentals
Row crops
Sod
Sugarcane
Urban
Natural areas
Sub-total
Point Sources
CAFOs
Total

TP load
attenuated to
the outlet
(mtons yr-1)

CAFOs: Concentrated animal feeding operations.

Table 4-6. Total annual costs and corresponding potential cost savings for the commandand-control (CAC) and the least-cost abatement (LCA) approaches for achieving
different TP load reduction targets in the Upper Kissimmee (UK) sub-watershed.
Baseline TP
load (mtons
yr-1)
78.7
78.7
78.7
78.7
78.7
78.7
78.7
78.7

TP load
reduction
target
(mtons yr-1)
32.3 (41%)
35.9 (46%)
43.8 (56%)
47.9 (61%)
50.1 (64%)
52.8 (67%)
55.4 (70%)
56.2 (71%)

Total CAC cost
($ million yr-1)

Total LCA cost
($ million yr-1)

$ 43.2
$ 45.6
$ 148.6
$ 151.6
$ 151.0
$ 214.8
$ 219.3
$ 233.5

$ 8.9
$ 11.7
$ 21.4
$ 81.1
$ 122.2
$ 154.9
$ 216.5
$ 221.9
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Potential cost
savings
($ million yr-1)
$ 34.3 (79%)
$ 33.9 (74%)
$ 127.2 (86%)
$ 70.4 (46%)
$ 38.8 (24%)
$ 59.9 (28%)
$ 2.8 (1%)
$ 11.6 (5%)

Table 4-7. Total annual costs and corresponding potential cost savings for the commandand-control (CAC) and the least-cost abatement (LCA) approaches for achieving
different TP load reduction targets in the Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS) subwatershed.
Baseline TP
load (mtons
yr-1)
120.1
120.1
120.1
120.1
120.1

TP load
reduction
target
(mtons yr-1)
36.4 (30%)
38.8 (32%)
48.6 (41%)
52.2 (43%)
68.0 (57%)

Total CAC cost
($ million yr-1)

Total LCA cost
($ million yr-1)

$ 6.9
$ 7.1
$ 8.1
$ 8.6
$ 11.2

$ 2.9
$ 3.4
$ 5.0
$ 6.1
$ 10.1

Potential cost
savings
($ million yr-1)
$ 4.0 (58%)
$ 3.7 (53%)
$ 3.1 (38%)
$ 2.5 (29%)
$ 0.6 (5%)

Table 4-8. Number of credits available to sell and number of potential sellers and buyers
for different TP load reduction targets in the Upper Kissimmee (UK) sub-watershed.
TP load
reduction
target (%)
41%
46%
56%
61%
64%
67%
70%
71%

No. of credits
available

No. of potential
sellers

No. of potential
buyers

7,785
6,339
9,694
6,400
3,270
3,003
577
709

26
23
31
27
18
15
7
4

15
20
2
1
6
7
12
18

Table 4-9. Number of credits available to sell and number of potential sellers and buyers
for different TP load reduction targets in the Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS) subwatershed.
TP load
reduction
target (%)
30%
32%
41%
43%
57%

No. of credits
available

No. of potential
sellers

No. of potential
buyers

20,318
20,897
20,893
20,092
2,716

31
20
23
19
16

8
13
14
14
11
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Table 4-10. Net cost savings of the WQTP for the Upper Kissimmee (UK) and Taylor
Creek/ Nubbin Slough (TCNS) sub-watersheds using the selected TP reduction targets.

Baseline TP load
TP load reduction target
Load after BMPs and technologies are adopted
Credits traded
Credit price
Cost incurred by sellers under the CAC approach
Cost incurred by sellers under the LCA approach
Cost incurred by buyers under the CAC approach
Cost incurred by buyers under the LCA approach
Cost of credits traded
Cost of transaction (10% of credits traded)
Savings for sellers
Savings for buyers
Net cost savings

UK
78.7
46
42.8
4,601
$ 673
$ 0.2
$ 2.3
$ 40.2
$ 2.9
$ 3.1
$ 0.3
$ 1.0
$ 33.9
$ 34.9
76

TCNS
120.0
32
81.3
10,495
$ 130
$ 0.2
$ 1.2
$ 4.5
$ 0.2
$ 1.4
$ 0.1
$ 0.3
$ 2.8
$ 3.2
45

TP: Total phosphorus; CAC: command-and-control; LCA: least-cost abatement.
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Units
mtons yr-1
%
mtons yr-1
kg reduced
$ kg-1 reduced
$ million yr-1
$ million yr-1
$ million yr-1
$ million yr-1
$ million yr-1
$ million yr-1
$ million yr-1
$ million yr-1
$ million yr-1
%

4.7. Figures

Figure 4-1. Lake Okeechobee watershed (LOW) detailing the sub-watershed boundaries
and the major hydrologic components.
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Figure 4-2. Study areas (a) Upper Kissimmee (UK) and (b) Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough
(TCNS) illustrating the major hydrologic components and the rainfall stations.

Figure 4-3. Location of selected point sources in the (a) Upper Kissimmee (UK) and (b)
Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS) sub-watersheds.
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Figure 4-4. Land use distribution in the (a) Upper Kissimmee (UK) and (b) Taylor
Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS) sub-watersheds.

Figure 4-5. Total Phosphorus (TP) loading spatial distribution (kg ha-1 yr-1) at the source
level in the (a) Upper Kissimmee (UK) and (b) Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS)
sub-watersheds.
151

Figure 4-6. Zone classification of the phosphorus attenuation factors in the (a) Upper
Kissimmee (UK) and (b) Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS) sub-watersheds.
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Figure 4-7. Total annual costs ($ million yr-1) for achieving different TP load reduction
targets in the (a) Upper Kissimmee (UK) and (b) Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS)
sub-watersheds.
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Figure 4-8. Credit prices ($ kg-1 of TP reduced) for achieving different TP load reduction
targets in the (a) Upper Kissimmee (UK) and (b) Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS)
sub-watersheds.
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Figure 4-9. Summary of the four factors influencing the selection of the cap level for the
Upper Kissimmee (UK) and Taylor Creek/Nubbin Slough (TCNS) sub-watersheds.

Figure 4-10. Best management practices (BMP) and advanced wastewater treatment
(AWT) technologies selected in the Upper Kissimmee (UK) sub-watershed under the (a)
CAC and (b) LCA approaches for meeting a preset 46% TP load reduction target. C
stands for citrus, IP for improved pastures, UP for unimproved pastures, RWP for
rangeland and wooded pastures, D for dairies, FC for field crops, O for ornamentals, RC
for row crops, SO for sod, U for urban, and WWTF for wastewater treatment facilities.
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Figure 4-11. Best management practices (BMP) selected in the Taylor Creek/Nubbin
Slough (TCNS) sub-watershed under the (a) CAC and (b) LCA approaches for meeting a
preset 32% TP load reduction target. C stands for citrus, IP for improved pastures, UP for
unimproved pastures, S for sugarcane, CAFOs for concentrated animal food operations,
FC for field crops, O for ornamentals, RC for row crops, SO for sod, and U for urban.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Summary and Conclusions
For the past decades, incentive-based programs have been an area of active
development to solve environmental problems. Incentive-based policies relie on market
incentives to both, reduce pollution and minimize abatement costs. In order to better
understand the prospects of this policy in the water quality arena, this dissertation
examined the advantages and challenges that have arisen from the nationally and
internationally implemented programs so far. As discussed in Chapter 2, costeffectiveness, decision making flexibility, involvement of non-regulated pollution
sources, and technological innovation for pollution abatement were highlighted as major
benefits promoting the development and implementation of water quality trading
programs. Some of these theoretical advantages were observed in the case studies
illustrated in this chapter. However, not a single policy comes without its drawbacks. The
investigated case studies faced significant challenges from the policy design through the
implementation phase. The major challenges discussed were the creation of localized
areas with high pollution levels (known as “pollution hotspots”), uncertainties related to
nonpoint source emissions, and the high transaction costs associated with research,
negotiations, monitoring, and enforcement. Key elements to consider when designing and
implementing a water quality trading program were pollutant suitability, abatement costs
differentials among pollution sources, feasible market structures, and stakeholder’s
willingness to participate. Furthermore, the meta-analysis conducted using several water
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quality trading case studies revealed that minimization of nonpoint uncertainty, policy
drivers, and social embeddedness were the most significant variables influencing the
success of a trading program. The integration of those variables and the introduction of
innovative thinking to overcome regulatory, technical, and economic challenges are of
significant importance for the implementation of a viable and sustainable trading
program.
A comprehensive modeling framework, integrating a hydrologic-water quality model
with an economic model, was developed in Chapter 3 to assess and compare the costeffectiveness of two environmental policy strategies to reduce phosphorus loadings to
Lake Okeechobee. In particular, I explored the benefits of implementing a water quality
trading program in an agricultural watershed (S-191 sub-basin) in order to achieve a
specific total phosphorus load reduction. Using the hydrologic-water quality model, water
flows and phosphorus loads generated on-site (at the source level) and attenuated to the
nearby stream were simulated. An additional in-stream attenuation algorithm was
developed to account for further phosphorus loads assimilation from the stream network
to the outlet of the sub-basin. Using the economic model, the least-cost combination of
Best Management Practices (BMPs) and technologies was identified in order to achieve
several phosphorus reduction targets. A cost-effective cap of 30% total phosphorus
reduction was selected for this sub-basin to develop a trading scenario and assess its
benefits when compared to a command-and-control approach. Results of this analysis
identified dairies, sod farms, and ornamentals land uses as potential credit buyers,
whereas improved pastures, citrus, and urban areas were found as potential credit sellers.
Furthermore, the estimated potential cost savings of the water quality trading scenario in
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the S-191 sub-basin versus a command-and-control approach were 27% ($ 1.3 million
per year) based on a credit price of $ 179 per kg of phosphorus reduced.
Motivated by the cost savings that could be generated from trading in an agricultural
sub-basin of the Lake Okeechobee watershed, I explored the application of the modeling
framework, developed in Chapter 3, in two larger sub-watersheds with different land use
and hydrologic conditions. The two sub-watersheds selected, the Upper Kissimmee (UK)
and Taylor Creek/ Nubbin Slough (TCNS), have been identified as major sources of total
phosphorus loadings to the lake, representing priority areas for the implementation of
water quality improving efforts. While evaluating and comparing the environmental and
economic feasibility of a water quality trading program, the effect of different caps on the
market potential was assessed in the two studied areas. Four factors influencing the
selection of the cap were analyzed: the least-cost abatement solutions, credit prices,
potential cost savings, and credit supply and demand. Hypothetical trading scenarios
were also developed, using the optimal caps selected for the two sub-watersheds, to
assess the economic advantages of a water quality trading program over a command-andcontrol approach in order to improve LO’s water quality. In both sub-watersheds, a
phosphorus credit trading program was less expensive than the conventional commandand-control approach. While attaining cost-effectiveness, keeping optimal credit prices,
and fostering market competition, phosphorus reduction targets of 46% and 32% were
selected as the most appropriate caps in the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds, respectively.
Hypothetical trading scenarios identified wastewater treatment facilities (WWTFs) and
urban areas in the UK, and concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) in the TCNS
sub-watershed, as potential credit buyers. Improved pastures were identified as the major
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credit sellers in both sub-watersheds. The estimated net cost savings resulting from
implementing a phosphorus trading program in the UK and TCNS sub-watersheds were
76% ($ 34.9 million per year) and 45% ($ 3.2 million per year), respectively.
While the results of this dissertation are promising, it is important to note that water
quality trading is not the only solution to improve Lake Okeechobee’s health, but rather
an additional tool to other phosphorus load reduction projects implemented in the
watershed. The realization of the environmental and economic benefits of this marketbased alternative is also contingent on other important factors, such as the market
structure, the specific program rules, the risk perception, and the education and outreach
to develop trusted relationships among regulatory agencies, the public sector, and other
stakeholders. Nevertheless, this research provided the foundation for stakeholders to
better understand whether water quality trading has the potential to work in the Lake
Okeechobee watershed and to facilitate the development of a pilot program. In addition,
this dissertation offered some insights on the potential economic opportunities that
pollution sources would have by participating in the trading program. Although this
research focused on the Lake Okeechobee watershed, it also provides a base framework
to assess the feasibility of future water quality trading programs in other watersheds.
5.2. Recommendations and Future Work
The results indicate that there is an important potential for a phosphorus trading
program to generate cost savings and water quality benefits in Lake Okeechobee.
Therefore, more efforts should be dedicated to this matter. The following
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recommendations, directed to future trading program managers, could help enhance the
potential benefits of a trading program implemented in the watershed:
•

Adopting a monitoring plan and increasing field-site inspections in the watershed to
verify the modeling results of nonpoint source loadings. Monitoring and verification
of load reductions from nonpoint sources and environmental performance of BMPs
should be conducted whenever possible. Regulatory agencies responsibility should be
shifted from imposing technologies and management practices to requiring
monitoring and measurement of the discharged phosphorus loads. This would reduce
the uncertainty about the magnitude of water quality improvement, not only for a
trading program, but for any program involving nonpoint sources.

•

Developing a market structure, such as clearinghouses or third-party aggregators to
reduce transaction costs by gathering information and bringing trading partners
together. In addition, the market structure could be enhanced by creating a
standardized market platform that can assist potential trading sources to either
estimate the amount of credits generated by adopting different management practices,
or to quantify the amount of credits needed to purchase, based on location and trading
ratios.

•

Establishing an outreach program to educate stakeholders on the environmental and
economic opportunities trading might offer, and on how potential trading sources
could participate. This would strengthen the relationship and communication between
regulators and trading participants, while encouraging the willingness to participate.

•

Conducting an assessment of the cost-effectiveness and environmental benefits of a
water quality trading program in all nine sub-watersheds discharging into Lake
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Okeechobee. Extending the geographic scope would allow the participation of a
larger number of sellers and buyers and a wider range of abatement cost differentials
that trading systems are designed to exploit.
•

Developing a regulatory framework supporting a water quality trading program to be
implemented as part of the Lake Okeechobee Basin Management Action Plan
(BMAP). Water quality trading rules, protocols to quantify credits and phosphorus
loads, liabilities in the event of failure to generate the expected credits, and eligibility
for participation could be incorporated in the revision of the plan, offering an
additional tool to achieve phosphorus load reductions within the watershed.
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APPENDIX
CALIBRATION AND VALIDATION OF THE WATERSHED ASSESSMENT
MODEL
This section provides visual comparisons between daily observed (blue) and
simulated (red) cumulative flows, total phosphorus (TP) concentration, and cumulative
TP loadings at each of the outlet structures of the calibrated areas. A summary of the
goodness-of-fit (GOF) statistical measures used for the calibration and validation
processes of the Watershed Assessment Model (WAM) is also provided. The calibration
and validation was performed in the Upper Kissimmee (UK) sub-watershed and in three
of the four basins within the Taylor Creek/ Nubbin Slough sub-watershed (S-154, S-133,
and S135). The calibration and validation of the S-191 basin is presented in SWET
(2011b). The calibration parameters for the in-stream attenuation analysis are also
reported in this Appendix.

163

Figure A-1. Calibration results for daily (a) cumulative flow, (b) Total Phosphorus (TP)
concentration, and (c) cumulative TP loading at the S-154 structure.
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Figure A-2. Calibration results for daily (a) cumulative flow, (b) Total Phosphorus (TP)
concentration, and (c) cumulative TP loading at the S-133 structure.
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Figure A-3. Calibration results for daily (a) cumulative flow, (b) Total Phosphorus (TP)
concentration, and (c) cumulative TP loading at the S-135 structure.
166

Figure A-4. Calibration results for daily (a) cumulative flow, (b) Total Phosphorus (TP)
concentration, and (c) cumulative TP loading at the S-65 structure in the Upper
Kissimmee sub-watershed.
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Table A-1. GOF statistical measures for monthly flow (m3 s-1).
Basin

No. of
observations

S-154
S-133
S-135
UK

36
36
36
36

S-154
S-133
S-135
UK

60
60
60
60

RMSE
(m3 s-1)

MBE
(m3 s-1)

Calibration (2002 - 2004)
1.97
-0.35
0.84
0.06
0.89
0.01
40.45
0.61
Validation (2005 - 2009)
1.11
0.09
0.84
0.09
0.47
0.01
29.69
4.40

NSE

0.54
0.80
0.69
0.33
0.72
0.54
0.84
0.18

RMSE: Root mean square error; MBE: Mean bias error; NSE: Nash-Sutcliff
efficiency coefficient.

Table A-2. GOF statistical measures for monthly total phosphorus (TP) concentration
(mg L-1).
Basin

No. of
observations

S-154
S-133
S-135
UK

34
35
36
36

S-154
S-133
S-135
UK

59
59
58
58

RMSE
(mg L-1)

MBE
(mg L-1)

Calibration (2002 - 2004)
0.25
-0.013
0.13
0.05
0.06
0.004
0.02
0.002
Validation (2005 - 2009)
0.26
0.05
0.12
-0.01
0.05
0.01
0.04
-0.002

NSE

-0.55
-0.60
0.38
0.19
-0.61
0.27
-0.03
0.07

RMSE: Root mean square error; MBE: Mean bias error; NSE: Nash-Sutcliff
efficiency coefficient.
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Table A-3. GOF statistical measures for monthly total phosphorus (TP) load (kg day-1).
Basin

No. of
observations

S-154
S-133
S-135
UK

36
36
36
36

S-154
S-133
S-135
UK

60
60
60
60

RMES
(kg day-1)

MBE
(kg day-1)

NSE

Calibration (2002 - 2004)
172.44
-34.22
47.17
-1.16
22.37
-1.57
263.38
23.16
Validation (2005 - 2009)
93.34
23.42
18.90
0.49
11.45
2.35
238.37
15.38

0.44
0.69
0.70
0.47
0.55
0.78
0.60
0.13

RMSE: Root mean square error; MBE: Mean bias error; NSE: Nash-Sutcliff
efficiency coefficient.

Table A-4. Calibrated parameters for the in-stream attenuation analysis.
Basin
Initial value
S-154
S-133
S-135
S-191
UK

Soluble P
a
Cb
(m s-1)
(mg L-1)
0.00015
0.02
0.00005
0.02
0.00005
0.025
0.00005
0.02
0.00015
0.02
0.00015
0.01

Sediment P
a
Cb
(m s-1)
(mg L-1)
0.0015
0.05
0.0015
0.01
0.00005
0.008
0.00015
0.01
0.0015
0.02
0.00015
0.008

P: Phosphorus; a: Rate of load transfer coefficient; C b : Stream background
concentration.
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